

**SERVICE DELIVERY AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION:  
A CASE STUDY OF SELECTED SUB-COUNTIES  
IN MOROTO DISTRICT**

**BY  
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## DECLARATION

I, **Ngoya John Bosco**, hereby declare that this dissertation contains the findings of my own study and has never been presented to any other institution of learning for the award of a Master's degree or any other academic qualification.

Signed: ----- Date-----

This dissertation has been submitted with the approval of my supervisor.

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## **DEDICATION**

This work has been dedicated to my late **Dear Mother Lorot Martina Ngikudiica** whose life was claimed by the endless conflict in Karamoja! Mom thanks for the inspiration and may your blood bring lasting peace to Karamoja.

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## **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

ADOL-Action for Development of Local Communities  
AIDS-Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome  
ARELIMOK-Action for Reduction of poverty and Livestock Modernization in Karamoja  
ARLPI-Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative  
AWE-Association for World Education  
CBOs-Community Based Organizations  
C&D-Cooperation and Development  
CSOs –Civil Society Organizations  
DANIDA-Danish International Development Aid  
EU-European Union  
FAO-Food and Agricultural Organization  
FBOs- Faith Based Organizations  
GRDS-Government’s Rural Development Strategy  
HIV- Human Immune Virus  
IDPs- Internally Displaced Persons  
IGAD-Inter Governmental Authority on Development  
IMF-International Monetary Fund  
IRC-International Rescue Committee  
KADEP-Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Development Programme  
KDA-Karamoja Development Agency  
KIDDP-Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme  
KISP-Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peace  
KOPEIN-Kotido Peace Initiative  
KPIU-Karamoja Projects’ Implementation Unit  
LGD-Local Governments Departments  
LGDP-Local Government Development Program  
MADEFO-Matheniko Development Forum  
MAI-Minority Agency International  
MoFPED – Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development  
MONARLIP-Moroto-Nakapiripirit Religious Leaders Initiative for Peace  
MKA-Ministry of Karamoja Affairs

MTN-Mobile Telecommunication Network  
NGOs- Non Governmental Organizations  
NRM-National Resistance Movement  
NUSAF-Northern Uganda Social Action Fund  
OCODI-Omaniman Community Development Initiative  
OPM-Office of the Prime Minister  
PEAP-Poverty Eradication Action Plan  
PMA-Plan for Modernization Agriculture  
PRSP – Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper  
RCSN-Riamiriam Civil Society Network  
TL - Tegla Lorupe  
UBOS-Uganda Bureau of Statistics  
UHRC-Uganda Human Rights Commission  
UN-United Nations  
UNDP-United Nations Development Programme  
UNICEF-United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund  
UP-Uganda Police  
UPDF-Uganda Peoples Defense Forces  
UPE-Universal Primary Education  
USE-Universal Secondary Education  
WFP-World Food Programme

## **ABSTRACT**

The study explored and examined the effectiveness of service delivery (in particular water and road and communication network) as a strategy for conflict transformation in Moroto District. It was hinged mainly on the theoretical framework of John Paul Lederach and the social capital theory and analyzed the two major contributing elements to conflict transformation, namely, peace building and service delivery. The study combined both documentary research (for secondary data) and field survey research methods by for finding responses to three major research questions derived from the research objectives: - What are the indicators for the need of the current and past conflict transformation strategies used in Moroto district to mitigate conflict? To what extent have conflict transformation strategies effectively mitigated conflict in Moroto district? How has service delivery specifically contributed towards conflict transformation in Moroto district?

The study's major findings indicate that conflict transformation in Moroto district has been set back by insecurity and other conflicts, which are caused by: - harsh climatic conditions which limit alternative livelihoods; traditional practices which have orchestrated overstocking of animals; proliferation of small arms; corrupt tendencies at various levels; lack of government commitment to the pastoralists concerns and a clash between the modern and traditional mechanisms of administration. Study findings also show that, conflict transformation is heavily reliant on: - efficient and effective service delivery, appropriate policy framework, community empowerment and participation together with cooperation and coordination of all stakeholders and sustainability of interventions.

The study recommends the following solutions:- addressing the causal factors of insecurity/conflict like the harsh climatic conditions and the resultant drought; exploring a cross-section of alternative livelihoods for the pastoralist groups; pursuit of deliberate efforts to develop policy framework suitable for pastoralists; strengthening and promoting a genuine fusing of the modern and traditional models of conflict transformation and ensuring effective coordination of all stakeholders working in the district.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY**

#### **1.0 General introduction**

This chapter presents the background of the study, the statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, the specific objectives of the study, the research questions, the scope of the study, the justification and operational definition of terms and concepts.

Violent conflicts and insecurity continue to be major constraints to the achievement of sustainable livelihoods and development in Moroto District. Over the years, conflict has become more frequent, highly unpredictable and exhibited marked escalation in violence. It has turned out to be more geographically spread and increasingly more intractable with its effects on delivery of social services bordering on prevention of full and participatory implementation of development. Hence, this study investigated the effectiveness of service delivery as a strategy for conflict transformation in Moroto District in addition to the peace building related methods.

#### **1.1 Background to the study**

International understanding of the relationship between conflict and development has changed rapidly through the last decade. There is a wider recognition that conflict may not be resolved purely by military and political means (Goodwin: 2005:101). Further, it has been observed that conflict stands directly in the way of achieving development goals (MoFPED: 2003:15). Moreover, many scholars have argued that the world has been divided into secure richer areas and insecure poorer ones and that the transformation of the state under the effects of globalization is a fundamental issue under contention (Macours, Janvry Alain and Sadoulet Elisabeth: 2007:1, 2) This contention is likewise realized in Uganda and Karamoja in particular.

In the same vein, the Berlin conference of 1884 -1885 which led to the split of people into territorial political units without considering traditional setups is the reference point of the root cause of conflict in Karamoja, and specifically Moroto District. Wherever there was resistance to the colonial balkanization, tribal wars and fights over land became evident as it was recorded in 1911 when the Protectorate Government decided to close the district to all traders (Office of the Prime Minister 2005:4). In its current form, conflict is being fed by firefighting responses which by error or omission do not recognize the beneficiary communities as an anchor to sustainability and this has broadened the earlier thinking that conflict was caused by colonial misrule.

Moroto District, part of the former “Karamoja province”, is located in Karamoja sub-region, of North-Eastern Uganda. Moroto District has three counties (Bokora, Matheniko and Moroto Municipality), eleven sub counties and covers an area of 8,600sqkilometers. According to the 2002 population census, 189,940 people live in Moroto District (UBOS: 2005:10)

Moroto District’s climatic zone is semi-arid and characterized by a prolonged dry season from October to March. Three main ethnic groups – Karimojong (89%), the main inhabitants of the rangelands and the Pokot and the Tepeth (11%), who live in mountains of Moroto and Napak, reside in Moroto District. While these people have differences in language and culture, they share a similar socio-economic lifestyle; they all are agro-pastoralists who practice subsistence crop production along with semi nomadic animal rearing (UBOS, 2005:10).

According to Novelli (1988), the cultural identity of the Karimojong who live in Moroto District is characterized by the:-

pre-eminence of the territorial dimension above that of the clan in their social organization; the structure of generations and of age-sets, a characteristic of pastoral peoples, which gives the tribe a democratic form of government, of truly human dimension; the substantial balance of the role of the sexes who find in Complementarity the way to personal fulfillment and to the progress of the people; the unique role of livestock which, not only by its economic value, but also by the other trans-economic values; the importance of alliances sealed with livestock; alliances with God through the sacrifices of heads of livestock, and alliances with family groups through exchange of cattle for women (Novelli, 1988).

The unique characteristics of the Karimojong cultural and socio-economic aspects offer challenges and opportunities for the District's service delivery mechanisms. For example, part of the population moves from place to place in search of grass and pasture, while the other part lives a sedentary life as farmers. This has been the main cause of inter-state conflicts between Kenya and Ugandan pastoralists, but above all between Karimojong and its neighbouring districts and this form of conflict has in recent years been increasing across what is a highly porous and – for many local communities, at least – artificial border. By and large, the cultural rites, dances, marriage practices, dressing code and traditional architecture of the Karimojong is the same.

Most of Moroto District is a semi-arid rangeland with its people, the Karimojong who are characterized mainly by a pastoral and non-sedentary way of living, having unique power relations. Scarcities of pasture and water weaken the condition of livestock. Production of dairy products, an essential component of the nomadic diet, is drastically reducing, the value of livestock is declining, and the prices of both locally produced and imported cereals are significantly increasing.



The quantity and quality of social services (water, schools, health care, roads and communication network) are limited and may not be appropriate for the District nor the Karimojong's socio-economic lifestyle. For example, the worsening climatic conditions, which result in insufficient water sources has led to increased competition and conflicts over these limited resources. Groups are forced to seek water sources in the neighbouring districts. This creates conflict between the pastoral Karimojong and their agro-based neighbours (Iteso, Langi, Acholi and Sabiny), a reality that brings into play actors like the Government.

The inadequacy of social services (water and better road and communication network) makes the already insecure environment hostile and it is for this reason that conflict transformation becomes imperative because it offers a different set of approaches of resolving conflict that are influenced by positivism, namely, that conflict is not entirely negative but presents opportunities that ought to be tapped through peace building approaches like mediation/negotiation talks together with effective service delivery.

In spite of the various service delivery projects by both government and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Karamoja has remained the least developed region in Uganda. The blame for Karamoja's underdevelopment has been cast against the background of persistent insecurity in the region which manifests itself in cattle rustling and road banditry (Perlez: 1991:4). Very low literacy levels 12%, low access to health services 24.3%, and low incomes for the inhabitants, (as of 1991) are indicators which perpetuate and reinforce the existence of poverty (<http://www.karamoja.org>)

There are therefore pieces of evidence of conflict and low levels of service delivery in Moroto district. The study thus set out to explore and examine effectiveness of service delivery as a strategy for conflict transformation in Moroto District.

## **1.2 Statement of the problem**

In Moroto District, security for human beings and property remains precarious. Moreover, the conflict transformation approaches that have been applied so far have been misconstrued as “peace building”. In addition, strategies of peace building like mediation talks, disarmament and “food for arms” have remained ineffective and non-constructive. Furthermore, the extent of efficacy and efficiency of alternative conflict transformation strategies, like service delivery have hitherto not been explored.

In the same vein, Moroto district experiences limited livelihood alternatives which are construed to be the source of conflict. In addition, development investment approaches pursued are maladapted to the existing conditions to propel conflict transformation. To add on, there is political instability and poor infrastructure. In attempt to comprehend the above situation with a view of giving a way forward, this research explored and examined the effectiveness of service delivery as a conflict transformation strategy in Moroto district.

## **1.3 Scope of study**

The current study focused on how community infrastructure and national policies affect the capacity to transform conflicts faced by people living in conflict prone areas, particularly the pastoral communities in Moroto district between 1986 and 2005. During this period, the current government emphasized a broad spectrum of strategies for Moroto district in particular and

Karamoja region in general. As such, the research sought to investigate the extent to which sustainable service delivery contributes towards conflict transformation. Community infrastructure and proposed policies which were investigated included water, sanitation, roads, and communication networks.

The research was done in purposively selected sub-counties in Moroto District namely – Matany and Lopeei in Bokora county, and Tepeth, Nadunget, and Rupa in Matheniko county. Matany and Nadunget benefit more from social services due to proximity to better managed trunk roads than Lopeei, Tepeth and Rupa whose location at the fringes of the districts disadvantages accessibility to services. Purposive sampling allowed the researcher to home in a cross-section or a balanced choice of people or events, which have good grounds and critical for the research. The district (Moroto) was chosen because it used to be the headquarters of Karamoja region; therefore, it should have been the most developed in Karamoja region in terms of service delivery and conflict management mechanisms.

#### **1.4 General objective**

The purpose of this research was to explore and examine effectiveness of service delivery as a strategy for conflict transformation in Moroto District.

#### **1.5 Specific objectives**

- a) To examine indicators for the need for the current and past conflict transformation strategies used in Moroto District.
- b) To establish whether these conflict transformation strategies have effectively mitigated the conflict in Moroto district.
- c) To examine the potential of using service delivery as a conflict transformation mechanism.

## **1.6 Research Questions**

The main research questions which guided my inquiry included:-

- a) How have current and past conflict transformation strategies been used in Moroto district to mitigate conflict?
- b) To what extent have conflict transformation strategies effectively mitigated conflict in Moroto district?
- c) How has service delivery contributed towards conflict transformation in Moroto district?

## **1.7 Theoretical Frameworks**

Conflict transformation, as postulated by Lederach, does not suggest that we assume the elimination or control of conflict through things like peace talks, but rather recognize and work through its "dialectic nature."

“Once conflict occurs, it changes or transforms these people, events, and relationships that sparked off the initial conflict. Thus, the cause-and-effect relationship is cyclic: it stems from the people then influences their relationship to issues under dispute, and then spreads back to the people and relationships.” (Lederach et al., 2003)

In addition, the theory of Social Capital Formation which stresses the importance of social networks and relations/institutions in development (World Bank, 2000:225) was also engaged in the study to strengthen the need for service delivery premised on what society beholds rather than that which is alien or externally imposed by stakeholders.

In this study, the researcher used the theoretical definition of John Paul Lederach and inferred that conflicts change relationships in predictable ways, altering communication patterns and patterns of social organization, altering images of the self and of the other in a way that interventions are anchored on societal assets or capital like the networks.

Based on John Paul Lederach prescriptive theory, the research examined conflict transformation and gauged whether the destructive consequences of conflict can be modified through proper and community owned processes and interventions like service delivery and peace building so that

self-images, relationships, and social structures improve as a result of conflict instead of being harmed by it. The research believed like Lederach that effective conflict transformation can utilize the highlighting of differences in a constructive way, and can improve mutual understanding (Lederach, John Paul and Michelle Maiese, 2003) through eliciting practical responses to conflicts from the communities involved.

### **1.8 Significance of the study**

Pastoralists fall within a marginalized section of Uganda's population. Due to little attention given to their development, their quality of life also tends to be poor. The current study illuminated the effects of service delivery and access on one's quality of life in conflict-prone areas in order to use the research findings to influence the policy makers in designing new and effective approaches of addressing development.

Since scanty documented evidence exists on improved service delivery as a strategy for conflict transformation, the current study has provided baseline data for future reference. These data is necessary for the development of appropriate service delivery models in conflict prone areas. Indeed this information can be applied to the pastoral policy and development throughout the East African Community, where pastoralists reside.

### **1.9 Definition of Operational terms**

**Conflict** – any confrontation, misunderstanding, social disorganization, violence or tension resulting from pursuit of goals that are difficult to reconcile

**Conflict transformation** - movement from disagreement to agreement founded on well planned peace building approaches like peace talks, mediation and negotiation on one hand and adequate provision of social services on the other hand (Makerere University Faculty of Arts, MA Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Foundational Modules in Conflict Resolution and Peace Building Volume)

**Pastoralists** – people who make their living from livestock. Most move with their herds, often seasonally, for the best grazing land and water (UN OCHA).

**Service delivery** – the availability of infrastructure, human resources and actual services like good roads and communication network, water and proper sanitation facilities in a community

**Software delivery** – provision of capacity building in the form of trainings, workshops, seminars on a given issue of concern e.g. conflict.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

This chapter basically has focused on historical and recent responses to the problem of conflict/security in Moroto district. It begins with a wider scope of looking at the conflict dynamics in the larger sense, and then focused on state involvement in dealing with the problem. The literature reviewed has detailed the comprehensive view of conflict transformation with its vital constituent parts of peace building and service delivery.

In the final part, the literature review has traced the cycles of conflict in Moroto district and has analyzed the models of conflict transformation that have been applied noting their strengths and weaknesses. Finally the information gaps relating to conflict in Moroto district have been identified and a strategy for filling these gaps has been proposed.

#### **2.1 Conflict dynamics in Moroto District**

According to the Human Rights' Commission Special Report (2004), the conflict in Moroto has perpetually changed dimensions in terms of issues and methodology, due to unexpected reasons particularly in relation to the sort of peace and benefit alliances that exist at a given time.

The conflict in Karamoja and the neighbouring districts is historical. Subsequent governments in Uganda have tried to deal with it with varying degrees of success. To date there has been no lasting solution to the problem, and as a result the protection of a number of human rights have been put to question, among which are: the right to life, the right to education, the right to peace and security, the right to adequate standard of living, the right to property, right to development, freedom from discrimination, the right to health, and freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. (UHRC: 2004:1)

Essentially conflict manifests itself in four dimensions, namely: the intra-Karamoja conflict; the conflict with state organs; cross-district conflicts and the cross-border conflicts. The changing dimensions have heavily impacted on the peoples' lifestyles.

The changing climatic patterns which have been evidenced by the prolonged drought and heavy dependence on the vegetation cover through burning and sale of charcoal; the change of pastoralists' practices as a result of government policy which confines them to the dry belts without improving the social services, has greatly influenced relationships with the neighbouring districts and other stakeholders.

From pre-colonial times, the pastoralists of Moroto have been known to practice their own style of transhumance characterized by movement to the neighbouring districts during periods of pasture and water sources shrinkage. However, the transhumance resource use patterns of dry and wet season grazing areas have been undermined, hence occasionally resulting into inter clan conflicts to gain access to limited water holes and grazing land. The migration patterns in search of water and pastures which used to occur during the dry season (October – April) over the last ten years, and now virtually occur throughout the year, show the communities in the region either running away from the rustlers. This structured movement also indicates the pattern of the conflict. Vast areas of otherwise suitable range land have been rendered unusable due to the formation of security belts or "*no mans*" land (*Ngaperoi*) between warring ethnic groups, which often are transient, depending on the ability of existing lands to provide the population with livelihoods.



Traditionally, cattle rustling was a domestic survival mechanism enabling sections in society to acquire cattle or make recoveries of stolen livestock by other communities. However, over the last three decades, the practice has been increasingly commercialized as a means of getting rich quickly with no need for initial investment. In fact it has been turned into a show of force, the rule of the fittest and without concern for the weak. Intra-district or trading center markets (Kangole, Naitakwae, Matany, and Iriir) inter-district and trans-border (Locor-a-Ngimongin in Katakwi district, Nakabaat – at the Moroto-Kenya border) markets have become venues where illegally acquired animals are traded by cattle thieves and some security/government officials, (Mafabi: 2008: 26 March). This practice has in effect exacerbated the frequency and magnitude of the rustling. In the recent past, it has been widely reported that well organized raids have been executed in liaison with the commercial buyers who within a very short time transport the livestock to faraway places for sale.

In the face of the illegal trade of livestock, law enforcement and the administration of justice, is also a source of conflict between the state machinery and the local people because two parallel systems of administration of justice are practiced without mutual understanding or complementarity. The state (the local and central government structures) system of administration and justice have failed to incorporate the traditional mechanism, operated by village elders and aimed at detection and punishment of criminals, which according to a focus group discussion in Rupa sub county, works within the value system that is clearly understood and owned by the communities. Some local people often blame the police; the judiciary and the army for colluding with some communities against others. Under such circumstances, suspicions render policing and security interventions difficult due to the lack of local communities' support.

According to Mkutu, “the primary factors in violent conflicts involving pastoralists in the region (Moroto) are seen to be intensified cattle rustling and a local arms race, small arms proliferation facilitated by ‘transnational criminal networks’, and inadequate policing and state security.” Hence the changes from the traditional practices to the commercialization of cattle rustling as opposed to the pattern of cattle rustling has led to the escalation of conflict(Mkutu: 2001:ii).

## **2.2 Effects of the conflict**

Tracts of land, commonly known as security belts, are used mainly as hunting grounds for wild game like rabbit and guinea fowl (UHRC:2004:10). The infamous Kamusalaba area along Moroto Nakapiripirit road, the corridor between Bokora and Matheniko counties up to the Toror hills and Nakicumet between Moroto and Iriir are clear examples where no human settlement or land use is possible or physically visible owing to inadequacy of social services. Vast pieces of pasture land such as areas between Alekilek and Iriir have been deserted due to the insecurity caused by the cattle rustling and lack of any form of protection of property or human beings.

Since the 1940's, pastures and arable land have greatly been constricted by policies that have gazetted off vast pieces of land for forest and wetland preservation and game reserves. The areas affected include; - the Matheniko, Bokora and Pian game reserves.

The availability of arable land has further been constricted by the claims made by the Iteso of Katakwi district that a portion of Iriir - Lomaratoit, belongs to them. In a focus group discussion in Matany sub county, sentiments of policy resentment were expressed by one of the participants:- '*...nowhere in the Uganda has the government had to confer animals more rights than people apart from Karamoja...*' This statement echoes the feelings of many people in

Karamoja that the government is keenly interested in the preservation of the flora and fauna at the expense of their own livelihood.

However, it should be pointed out that survival patterns in Karamoja are not only influenced by the reduction of rangeland, but also by a range of factors including continued depletion of cattle stocks by raids, disease and drought. The difficulty in countering the effects of each of these elements cited has made the sustainability of livelihoods extremely hard for the Karimojong peoples.

As a consequence of these hardships, there has been a decline in the demographic growth curve of Karamoja. The UHRC report (2004), states that Karamoja has been described through events, as “*a tribe with a recessive population*” especially with regards to the male-female gender balance. Many male Karimojong have died on the battle fields and others whose cattle herds have been decimated, have been forced to migrate in search of survival opportunities in other parts of Uganda, notably Eastern Uganda:- Busia, Mbale, Malaba and Iganga and Kampala city. It is widely believed that many households in Karamoja would be female headed, had it not been for the strong patriarchal culture among the people (UHRC: 2004:33) In the absence of the husband or uncle to head the household, the female headed household is under pressure to step in to, on top of the household upkeep, manage all other affairs prescribed by society on the head of the household, usually, a man. In the long run, this has a wear and tear effect on the societal structures.

The most daunting effects and direct outcome of incessant insecurity in the region has been the overwhelming number of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). By definition IDPs fall into a

category of displaced persons who have been forced to leave their places of origin due to disturbances: including armed conflict. Due to the traditional reputation of the Karimojong as warriors, often, the Karamoja experience of IDP phenomenon is overlooked or misrepresented. They are perceived as perpetrators and not empathized with as victims. Many people have been internally displaced within Karamoja itself, in the neighbouring districts and across the border with Kenya. There is an influx of the Karimojong to urban centers as street people and even some have hinted at their exploitation in human trafficking (Nkurunziza: 2007)

Several Disarmament Programmes have been put in place to curb the problem of insecurity. The first programme to deal with this issue was mounted in the later part of 1960s with the objective of persuading the Karimojong to abandon their spears. From the regime of Idi Amin to Obote II and even currently under H.E. Yoweri Museveni, Karamoja has been a testing ground of conflict resolution as one tactic of eliminating insecurity in the area. Government soldiers during the 1977 engaged in cordon and search operations for guns. One of the secondary effects of the military cordon and search operations tactic has been the increase in the number of IDPs. As homes are raided, livelihoods destroyed, the young warriors particularly have found themselves forced to shift from one unviable “manyatta” (a homestead or village) to another in order to avoid the army and save a few heads of cattle. This displacement also to an extent involved the entire household due to the fear that the army had information about the guns hidden in a particular homestead and soldiers might come back anytime. The massive internal displacement has led many disinterred Karimojong, particularly from Bokora, to the streets striving for survival in big towns like Kampala, Jinja, Iganga, Malaba, and Busia. According to Kopel et al (2006):

Museveni had promised to increase security for people who gave up their guns, but that promise proved empty. The disarmament only created a new group of victims, who were preyed upon by those who still had firearms. There were many instances of violence against the disarmed, by both

civilians and soldiers. After homes were bombed and crops were destroyed, thousands of tribes people fled across the border to Kenya. About 80,000 more people were internally displaced (Kopel: 2006)

Conflicts have destroyed the local coping mechanisms or support systems which had already been weakened by semi-desert nomadic livelihoods and poor food security. Most of the displaced persons had no alternative social networks to gravitate to since the Karimojong have been traditionally rural people. They have no relatives or Karamoja linked urban institutions, where they could easily access security and basic livelihood provisions. Many of charitable organizations currently hosting these category of Karimojong could only house a limited number. Missions, NGOs and local support system could not handle the recent upsurge of massive members.

In a bid to curb the influx of the rural-urban exodus, in November 2007, just at the eve of the CHOGM event, the government declared that all the Karimojong found in the streets would be rounded up and forced into the buses back to Karamoja or to remand homes like Kapiringisa. Such government pronouncements do not offer alternative support mechanisms, they tend to increase social tensions and foment more conflict.

The restricted movement of the Karimojong pastoralists has greatly inhibited their ability to access and fully utilize the available natural and human resources. As earlier mentioned many areas in Karamoja are inaccessible due to the prevailing insecurity. This has forced thousands of pastoralists to overgraze the relatively secure grazing grounds causing devastating environmental degradation and reduced livestock productivity. The people in Karamoja together with their livestock suffer immensely during the dry season because of the long droughts.

As both a cause and effect, the people of Moroto have for example been stigmatized as being backward and lazy. “*Many Ugandans know little about the Karimojong culture and dismiss it as one that is barbaric*” (Gackel: 2005:17). Negative images and stereotypes abound about the region as Legett (2001) details:

“The Karamojong are a social and political minority, have a lifestyle that few outsiders sympathize with, and are victims of stereotypes and prejudice. Many people recognize this. Nonetheless, their unprovoked and violent attacks on their neighbours tend to destroy feelings of understanding and goodwill and lead to pressure on the Government to ‘do something about the Karimojong’” (Legett: 2001:45)

### **2.3 A brief history of state involvement in conflict Transformation**

According to the UHRC report (2004), the problem of insecurity/conflict by Karimojong is best understood when one analyses the involvement of the State since colonial times. In 1954 when the first recorded cattle raids took place, the British colonial empire (state power of the times) simply acted as peace brokers and played roles in the restitution of the stolen animals to the victims. They did not address the motives or root causes for the cattle raids and the violence, for example in 1920, when the British pushed the Pokot, Sebei, Karimojong, and Turkana into conducting a peace ceremony, the hostilities only subsided for six months, as the Pokot, growing in numbers, sought to expand into Karamoja, which they did for the next seventy years (Knighton, 2002).

Uganda's post-independence governments on their part have been equally ineffective. In the 1960s when the cattle rustling was at its height, the UPC regime under Milton Obote came with its Administration of Justice (Karamoja) Act, which abolished the presumption of innocence for accused suspected raiders (OPM: 2005:4). Later on, in the 1970s under the military regime of Idi Amin Dada, the Matheniko raided the abandoned Military barracks in Moroto town and made off with semi automatic weapons, which they have been using to raid the neighbouring ethnic

groups (UHRC: 2004: 28). More recently, under the NRM regime of Yoweri Museveni in the 1980s to the present, we have observed soldiers who have been manipulating cattle raids to steal cattle. Mafabi (2008) recorded that officers in the army connived with local council chairpersons and stole cattle that had been impounded and sold them off.

In 1987, the Karamoja Development Agency was created by an Act of Parliament, primarily to oversee the transformation of Karamoja. The main objectives of KDA were envisaged as: bring about rapid socio-economic development, practical skills development, provide water, promote the productive capacity, improve health and education facilities and coordinate all developmental projects (Presidents Office: 1988:27). Subsequently, the Ministry of Karamoja Affairs (MKA) was established under the Office of the Prime Minister as the public service unit to oversee development in Karamoja. MKA then set up the Karamoja Projects Implementation Unit (KPIU) to guide the implementation of development programmes in the three districts of Karamoja (Moroto, Kotido and Nakapiripirit).

KPIU was largely funded by the European Union. Earlier on, there had been a host of programmes initiated by NRM Government under the Local Government Development Program (LGDP) and the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment. Under the Water for Production initiative implemented by the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment between 1999 and 2004, 9 high-yielding boreholes and 11 out of the planned 16 large dams had been completed by 2004 together with the planned maintenance of 850 kms road works (OPM 2005:15). The Uganda Government has also, in several public documents, made conflict resolution in Karamoja, through appropriate and timely response, a priority item on its agenda (World Bank report 2006:19).

However, it must be noted here that one of the most outstanding factors in the Karamoja conflict is the government failure, over the years, to effectively address the development challenges of the region with practical plans to alleviate the situation of poverty of the people. Under the British rule, the colonial administration attempted to introduce a system of sedentary agriculture and ranching, which if well implemented, would in effect settle the Karimojong and change their lifestyle. This approach, by any measure, was a miscalculation especially since it failed to consider the poor and variable rainfall patterns that dictated the water and pasture needs of the Karimojong.

Uganda's post-independence governments however have not investigated the causes of failure of these initiatives. Consequently, there has been no clear Government policy on pastoralism, which is the main source of livelihood for the people of Karamoja, to guide the long-term development planning of the region. The Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA), for example, which outlines the Government's Rural Development Strategy, is vague on Karamoja and pastoralism as an agricultural system.

GoU envisioned the solution to ending insecurity in the words of Marshall Thomas as:-

“A time of great military activity by the state to stop cattle-raiding once and for all. The skeleton in Uganda's nation-building cupboard was to be laid to rest by building roads across the remote passes, by manning police posts, and by laying down airstrips for spotter-planes to report every assembly and movement of men and cattle, in order to make their control more complete. Spears and guns were subject to strict regulations, and men felt their faith faltering when (put) under pressure from suspicious eyes in the sky” (Marshall: 1965:61f.).

In this way, the British colonial rule was successful in subduing Karimojong cattle-raiding after occupying the region, but never eliminated the casualties.



## 2.4 Conflict Transformation: a comprehensive view

Conflict transformation offers a different set of approaches of resolving conflict that are influenced by positivism, namely, that conflict is not entirely negative but presents opportunities that ought to be tapped through peace building approaches like mediation/negotiation talks together with effective service delivery.

Some attempts in terms of the social and physical infrastructure, have been made to develop Karamoja, but a number of factors have constrained the implementation of conflict transformation strategies like the disarmament exercise and they include, among others; inadequate planning, ineffective coordination, insufficient Government funding, inadequate involvement and mobilization of the local communities. As a result of the above factors, many Karimojong have since questioned the ability of the government to protect them, and have continued to re-arm and cause insecurity within Karamoja and the neighboring districts (OPM: 2005:31).

Colonial and post colonial attempts to disarm the Karimojong have been perceived as a precondition to the implementation of development programmes and establishment of service delivery mechanisms in Karamoja (Moroto, Kotido and Nakapiripirit districts). The Local Government Development Program (LGDP) and other efforts have been linking security and development in Moroto District, but with minimal success, if any. Many colonial and post colonial development efforts in Karamoja have been misdirected:-

*“Post independence governments focused on the use of force to maintain law and order in the region. However, since the relationship between the Karimojong and the state has always been characterized with violence, the people have pursued the strategy of protecting themselves from state aggression.” (Otim: 2005)*

In Karamoja, negotiation, mediation and peace efforts have often had minimum success owing to inadequate follow-up of proposed resolutions. OPM (2005) alludes to the “...*exploitation of situations by ‘conflict entrepreneurs’*. The local people in Karamoja have always said that they are tired of meetings and mediation processes without impact. Often, there is just a similitude of temporary ceasefire which tends to be a transient period of reorganization with tensed up communities eventually reverting to conflict. This indicates that there is something lacking, something that would provide a long term framework for peace and a source for alternative

income generation activities other than cattle. This study demonstrates how the provision of adequate social services could serve such a foundation for sustainable peace and development.

According to the UHRC (2004), the transformation of Karamoja from its present state of conflict to peace and co existence, requires a holistic and complex programme approach. The components of such programmes should include stabilization of the local economy and sustaining the disarmament efforts. The UHRC also proposes that there should be an attempt to reintegrate the displaced societies and protect the rights of the vulnerable groups like children, women, the elderly and the persons with disabilities. All these should be done together with the re-establishment of institutional structures to ensure good governance, the rule of law and democracy.

The theory postulated by the UHRC is put into simpler operationalisable terms by a Karimojong elder and leader Rev. P. Lokulan. In his words, he advised:-

The government's disarmament of the Karimojong warriors is a cumbersome venture that the NRM (government) should proceed cautiously. It should not be pressurized by some belligerent voices from the neighboring communities into hasty measures that will boomerang"... "The way forward to realize a successful disarmament,"... "is to use the 'stick and carrot' approach." He even recommends a lot of carrot on the menu! (Lokulan: May 2006).

This basically boils down to a peaceful approach to the conflict question. This is even more desirable because the conflict environment among the Karimojong and their kin in neighbouring countries has demonstrated that violence usually tends to be answered with more violence.

## 2.5 Service delivery as a strategy for conflict transformation

According to Stiglitz J.E. (1998:5), Development represents a *transformation* of society, a movement from traditional relations, traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of dealing with health and education, traditional methods of production, to more ‘modern’ ways.

Transformation of society moves away from just talking to people about it to working with people to realize it through participatory development of infrastructure.

Moroto attracts few goods and merchandise as well as services because of the poor infrastructure and road network system, the lack of markets, the combined effects of recurrent droughts, the ongoing conflict and the low purchasing power of the people. It has been noted that even those people that had no intention of engaging in illegal possession of guns have taken to this kind of lifestyle for personal safety. (UHRC 2004:37)



*Stuck on the road at Iriir: Typical of the road network in Moroto district (Photo by Ngoya J. Bosco)*

Central works department in Moroto district has eleven roads under use, whose total distance is 346.3 km covering all the sub counties or at least passing through all the sub counties, on the

other hand the district/sub county maintained roads covering 583.4 Km are 41 in number. Many of these roads have fallen into disuse or have disappeared as the vegetation has outgrown them owing to insecurity and lack of adequate materials (tyres for graders, fuel, finance and human resource) for maintenance.

For most people in Moroto water is got from boreholes, water holes (boreholes are deep cased and drilled water points while water holes are shallow water point), and ponds or from seasonal rivers that criss-cross the region. According to the engineer at Moroto district water department, the water service coverage is 53.7% with a 67.1% deep borehole functionality rate. Very often the water sources are located far away from the homesteads and are always shared with the animals thus causing high levels of water pollution. Much as Karamoja receives heavy torrential rains, there is no mechanism to tap the water run-off for use in the dry season, hence the justification given by the local people for migrating to the low lying areas like Teso, in pursuit of water and pasture.

For more than a decade, after Uganda became a British Protectorate in 1894, Karamoja remained un-administered by the colonial government. The semi-arid conditions were not favorable for the production of cash crops, such as cotton, coffee and tea, which Britain needed as raw materials to supply the industries its industries (Welch: 1969:51). Consequently, service delivery in Karamoja was not a British priority in a province deemed “unproductive”. The services which are available were thus calculated to serve their “minimal” commercial interest and were not conceived to serve the Karimojong’s priorities or even ensure their general well being.

The British government in 1960 – 1961, put a series of dams and security roads along the Karamoja belt. During that time, life for the Karimojong, (people and cattle) used to revolve around those dams for water. However, the numbers of law and order response roads used for surveillance were limited. Security patrols were used to facilitate rapid response and it was a relatively more peaceful time. In addition, the government of the time did sink boreholes everywhere for the pastoralists. To contribute towards peace and security, the current government should revitalize such programs.

The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) recognizes that “...since 2000 there have been major developments in the delivery of social services and continued economic growth. However, this growth has been highly unequal and as a result, poverty has increased. Insecurity has persisted; causing changes in the regional pattern of poverty”. It continues, “the last three years have seen very significant improvements in the access to public services and infrastructure. But the poor have much less access to services and infrastructure than the better-off.” (Uganda: Poverty Reduction Paper, 2005).

These state documents illustrate therefore, that, owing to Karamoja’s harsh climatic conditions, service delivery could ameliorate residents’ perspectives of survival. Currently, social service delivery sectors operating in Moroto District include Education, Health, and Security. In terms of effectiveness and efficiency, however, their performance is far from adequate. As a consequence, they cannot facilitate people to respond to other conflict transformation initiatives. This state of affairs puts into question the compatibility of conventional models of service delivery that are being used decades after the end of colonialism in Moroto District and it makes out-immigrations more appealing because of the social services that they get out of the region as

one Ekarimojongait<sup>1</sup> in the streets of Kampala remarked: - “...we have better access to health care in Kampala than in Karamoja ...there is a free clinic where we could access health care.”

## **2.6 Peace building without compromising livelihoods**

All stakeholders to the development process in Moroto district will agree that the use of a cross section of peaceful approaches in the disarmament programme were more beneficial than the military option, which was perceived to be adversarial. Statistics and information obtained from the Karimojong indicate that there were more guns collected when a peaceful strategy was applied, rather than under the forceful one. Much as the military option had its value in relation to combating attacks across the international borders and to stemming off minor raids and theft, it did not offer a cheaper, sustainable and people friendly alternative. The success of the programme should, however, be reviewed alongside peace building and service delivery strategies since there is consensus among all the stakeholders that this was not war, but a peaceful venture.

The Karimojong, Turkana, Pokot, and Sebei used to have disputes over grazing areas owing to the nomadic lifestyles of most of these communities. Knighton (2002) makes a mention of an event in 1920, when the British pushed the Pokot, Sabiny, Karimojong, and Turkana into conducting a peace ceremony, but hostilities only subsided for six months, as the Pokot, growing in numbers, sought to expand into Karamoja, which they did for the next seventy years.

The current disarmament initiative (2006/2007) (has) further exacerbated the insecurity in Bokora and undermined already stressed livelihood strategies and coping mechanisms. Interviewees in Bokora spoke of murder, rape, torture, looting and burning of manyattas by the UPDF during the on-going disarmament activities. (Stites E. et al: 2007:8)

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<sup>1</sup> Any person who originates from Karamoja region

Livestock holdings underpin nearly all traditional coping mechanisms of Karimojong communities, and the loss of livestock profoundly affects the food security and human security of households and villages. This calls for a response which is culturally appropriately designed, in the form of alternative livelihoods.

Periods of insecurity and fluctuations in animal herds (Michael (1978:49) have been a pattern of life in Karamoja for several decades. In the course of time, the ratio of cattle per person in Karamoja has dropped from 6 in 1920 to less than 2 today 1991(Ocan: 1992: 14). The steady downward trend in these processes (i.e. *insecurity* and on-going *loss* of animals) became particularly pronounced for the Bokora following the break-down of tribal relations and increased attacks in the mid 1970s through 1980s and, more recently, the wide-scale disarmament in 2001/2002 and 2006/2007. (Stites et al: 2007:2).

The lack of subsequent adequate protection by the state, particularly in 2001/2002, left the Bokora communities (inhabiting the Western part of Moroto) exposed to repeated attacks, widespread asset stripping, and the increased adoption of distress coping mechanisms in order to survive. Some of these distress coping mechanisms included, departure of youth to places which are unknown to them in order to engage in a range of livelihood strategies like begging, sweeping mills in exchange for collecting fallen grain, childcare for children of relatives living in the city, unloading lorries, stocking stores, collecting and selling metal found in garbage dumps and engaging in other odd jobs and at times without the support or knowledge of their families. (Stites et al: 2007:2)

Coupled with blatant asset stripping, the stocks of livestock have greatly diminished owing to animal disease outbreaks. Obore C. (April 2008), in the Monitor article: - *Karamoja: The mystery of the vanishing cows*<sup>2</sup> intimates:-

“The livestock population in Karamoja sub region is staring devastation in face following an attack of the dreaded East Coast fever disease that is killing off the animals at an alarming rate. The human population in this region that is largely dependent on livestock is also at risk... At this rate, in about three months, Karamoja will be a disaster epicenter”

With the poor resource and economic base in the region, the Government's failure to provide opportunities for employment and exposure to modern and alternative livelihoods, and the lack of ample cattle markets as a result of the low purchasing power, as evidenced in lower prices that people are willing to receive from commercial traders coming from urban centers like Mbale and Soroti, the Karimojong population is highly at the risk of devastation. There is a lot of dissatisfaction, grievances, and a feeling of helplessness among the population, particularly among the youth. Many youths who have been herd boys, commonly referred to as **‘Karachuna’**<sup>3</sup> are said to resort to rustling and roadside banditry as an easy means of survival. The state of affairs has eroded the authority of the elders and the youth now act in their individual capacity without seeking the traditional blessing and approval of the community elders and leadership. In this way, most conflicts orchestrated by cattle rustling have limited traditional relevance; thus, have no community based mechanism for resolving.

In one of the focus group discussion held in Matany sub-county, there was a general feeling among the people in Karamoja that the Government has deliberately ignored pastoralism, and yet is not offering any alternative mode of production and means of livelihood for the people.

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<sup>2</sup> Obore Chris (2008), *Karamoja: The mystery of the vanishing cows*, *The Monitor publication*, [http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/sun\\_news/Karamoja\\_the\\_mystery\\_of\\_the\\_vanishing\\_cows](http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/sun_news/Karamoja_the_mystery_of_the_vanishing_cows)

<sup>3</sup> Any male active warrior youth, (usually) capable of participating cattle rustling activities



Another school of thought believes that even the advocates of such alternatives have similarly failed to come up with viable and sustainable sedentary livelihood strategies.

## **2.7 Local Community interventions in Conflict Transformation**

Interventions for peace building and conflict resolution found space within the local communities with a number of inter-district and inter-ethnic group meetings being conducted between the Karimojong and neighbouring tribes. Such initiatives aimed at bringing peace and solving grievances in an amicable manner have been exploited in areas like Katakwi and Acholi.

Many people in Karamoja are weary of the fighting and the ensuing destruction of property and they are committed to the championing of these peace initiatives through organizing problem solving meetings. Locally based initiatives like the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), Teso Initiative for Peace, the Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peace, Happy Cow Project, Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Development Programme, Kotido Peace Initiative, all continue to contribute towards building a culture of tolerance and peace among the Karimojong and its neighbours.

After several years of unrelenting conflict, on the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2003, Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peace (KISP), a USAID supported organization facilitated an extended process of discreet discussions and personal contacts which resulted in a declaration by the Pian and the Bokora ethnic groups that they would no longer carry out raiding activities against each other. Similar agreements were reached between other ethnic groups, allowing travel between clan territories for the purchase of cattle.

## **2.8 Aspects of effective and sustainable Community support mechanisms**

Community support is very vital for the effectiveness and sustainability of any grassroots developmental project. It entails active engagement in the project cycle (Planning, implementation and Monitoring) of the local community by all stakeholders working with such communities.

The relative success of the 2001-02 disarmament exercise under the NRM government is attributed to the community support. “....*Unfettered and unwavering community support ...especially from the elders was responsible for the success of the disarmament. The local community was involved in the operations.*” (Office of the Prime Minister 2005:25). As a result, (UHRC: 2004:70) in Moroto district alone, by January 2004, 2,223 guns were collected (1,554 in Bokora and 669 in Matheniko).

Sabine M. Schmidt (2006) in her writing on “*Pastoral community Organization, Livelihoods and Biodiversity Conservation in Mongolia’s Southern Gobi Region*” cites the models of community participation in the management of “community areas” as a valuable contribution to the international discourse on innovative governance (service delivery of pastoral communities). These models are characterized by: community ownership and participation; a committee of elders in charge of decision making on resource use; and constant follow ups of resolutions in regard to relationships with neighbours.

### **2.8.1 Community participation in Conflict-related Development Analysis, policy formulation and implementation**

The UHRC report acknowledges the governments' failure over the years to effectively address the development challenges of the region with practical plans to alleviate the suffering of the people:-

“Subsequent governments in Uganda have tried to deal with it with varying degrees of success. To date there has been no lasting solution to the problem....” (UHRC: 2004:1).

Other development analysts like Stiglitz have similarly observed that:-

“It follows from the above that effective change cannot be imposed from outside ... Indeed; the attempt to impose change from the outside is as likely to engender resistance and give rise to barriers to change, as it is to facilitate change. At the heart of development is a change in ways of thinking, and individuals cannot be forced to change how they think” (Stiglitz: 1998:15).

Hence participation at the community level allows the choice of project to reflect the needs and preferences within the community, and the project design to reflect local information, ensuring that local conditions, preferences and circumstances are taken into account. This builds trust amongst the people and ownership; it also acts as a preventive mechanism in pre-stalling conflict.

### **2.8.2 Cooperation and coordination of traditional groups and other stakeholders**

Stites et al (2007), details the snowball effect as an explanation for the continued urban drift of the Karimojong based on cooperation or coordination of the people and attraction to poles of better service provision. She refers to this phenomenon as ‘*social safety nets*’. These are defined as a process whereby one person follows the next who follows the next, resulting in the out-migration of the “safety net” of people who share familial, village, or clan connections. In its final stages, this process exposes a community to vulnerability as its “safety nets” have been eroded and “drained out”.

Populations from southern Karamoja traditionally moved their herds into Teso pastures during the dry seasons, and established ‘stock associates’ or long-term—even multi-generational—connections between patriarchs across the district and national borders. Individuals would return to their stock associates each year, and they prioritized these relationships for trade and exchange. People who out-migrated for casual labor on a temporary or seasonal basis often went to work for a stock associate of their family. These networks could go back in existence to several generations. For example, Loonyoi who is from Lokopo sub-county and Aleper Anna Grace from Matany sub-county have strong affiliation to the Teso community of Amuria district and Kumi district who were their stock associates, respectively. As a result of these linkages, they have enjoyed intercultural trade, trans-border marriages, the extension of social safety nets to a wider geographical scope, and the trans-border sharing of resources and knowledge between the Karimojong and Iteso.

The Karimojong in Moroto district heavily relied on a mechanism of coordination and cooperation that cannot be compared with any other Ugandan ethnic groupings as illustrated in the UHRC report (2004:8);

*“Natural resource management in Karamoja is based on communal tenancy land systems. The territorial area is worked and protected by communities who control the usage of the scarce resources.”*

Watkins et al (2002) observe that, service providers (local governments and Civil society organizations) in Moroto have limited appreciation and conceptualization of the exceptional characteristics of the clients, who happen to be predominantly the Karimojong. There is an assumption by the service providers that they can better describe the problems of the Karimojong and prescribe more effective solutions. Coupled with this, both the Karimojong and the service providers have a negative perception and attitude of the other. The Karimojong perceive the

service providers as strangers and usurpers of traditional power and, hence, respond with caution to their externally driven development messages.

In an article entitled, *Karamoja: Resurrecting the pen* by Munaabi G. (2006)<sup>4</sup> :-

The climax of their resistance against colonial education is well documented in the (in) famous burial of a pen (*Kallumu*) in the 1930s following a successful campaign against foreign education and faith by the Karimojong elders.

Changing this perception requires long term re-orientation of the development workers in Karamoja so as to start appreciating local values and work with communities to inculcate new value shifts

### **2.8.3 Empowerment of the communities**

Uganda Human Rights Commission (2004) recognizes that the development of the ethos and ideals of human rights must stem from empowering the people with the knowledge of their constitutional rights and duties. This can be done through undertaking human rights sensitization programmes so as to change behaviour and attitude while at the same time relating them to their traditional mechanisms of social cohesion and endogenous situations and experiences. Once this has been achieved, the issue of peace and development can then be discussed using Karimojong lenses. The stakeholders themselves would partake of the duties and responsibilities involved in making development in Karamoja a reality.

In order to increase effectiveness and minimize administrative costs, it is imperative that all strata of society are involved in participatory planning sessions and also in the actual implementation of programmes as opposed to top down approach where the district or the central governments prepares data and frameworks and load it upon the local communities to

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<sup>4</sup> accessed from <http://www.ugpulse.com/articles/daily/Heritage>

implement, disregarding the views of the actual beneficiaries. Much as the sensitization teams targeted different groups of people, they were accused of ignoring the youth that are engaged in the actual rustling. In their outreach, the teams mainly addressed children, women and the elderly men. This was because most of the youth were said to have moved with the kraals far from any other human activity in search of pastures and water for their animals.

This therefore calls for a departure from the conventional consultative methods of development on this issue, that: the Bataringaya report recommends, *“The problem facing Karamoja is a virtual breakdown of law and order... (Thus), if Karamoja is to cease to be the problem that it is now, the pace of development must be forced and forced hard, and if this is to be done, it should be NOW or NEVER!”*(Bataringaya; 1961:15). The UPC Government seems to have used this philosophy which, seen from the Karimojong perspective is brutal, harsh and paternalistic.

The same development philosophy seems to have been applied through Amin’s regime’s “Operations” in the 1970s; the use of “force, hard force” was still felt by the Karimojong as “Might is right”. The current government with its cordoning off of whole villages and tracing the alleged “attackers” by helicopter and the repeated “Disarmament Exercises” is still using force. In the literature reviewed, development has been projected and planned from the “outsiders” eyes. There is thus lack of documentation of conflict transformation envisioned from the Karimojong perspective. This is the information gap that the study proposes to fill up.

## **2.9 Summary of the Literature Review**

The interventions directed towards conflict amelioration in Karamoja have been overshadowed by competing needs in the region and lack of political will to engage conflict to its conclusion.

Relating literature on service delivery by UBOS: 2005, OPM: 2005, World Bank: 2006; Poverty Reduction Paper: 2005 together with those on conflict transformation like by UHRC: 2004, Lederach: 2003; Stites: 2007 provided the research a rich background upon which other research works should adopt understanding linkages between varying concepts as a building blocks for sustainable community transforming actions.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

In examining the effectiveness of service delivery as a strategy of conflict transformation in Moroto district, this chapter covers the research design, study area and population, sample size, data collection methods, validity and reliability of the instruments and data analysis. The research collected statistical and qualitative data in Moroto district, northeastern Uganda. These methods have been chosen because:- the researcher was interested in the type of information that respondents say in their own words about their experiences and interaction in natural settings; the importance of 'insider' perspective; sensitivity of investigating policies and practices that have inflicted suffering and great loss to the respondents.

#### **3.1 Research design**

Qualitative initial documentary research from libraries of Makerere University and literature from locally based institutions like unpublished but very up to date MA dissertations, statistical method and case study were used in this research due to the need to quantify the factual relationships on the service delivery and carry out an exploratory study to gather information which described the factors that perpetuate conflict. The researcher used a pre-coded questionnaire to collect data for the situation analysis of service delivery, the causes of insecurity in Moroto district and the extent to which service delivery relates to conflict. The researcher also used Percentages, graphs and tables for analysis of quantitative baseline data.

Description and content analysis was used for processing qualitative information gathered from the field. Later, most frequent observations were quoted and interpreted in the research report.



### 3.2 Study population

The study targeted both recipients (community) and providers (government institutions and development partners) of services in Moroto district. This study used a multi-stage sampling method, to target representatives from local government administration/security personnel, ten civil society organizations, and forty four community members. Five sub counties were chosen from the **two constituencies**: - Matany and Lopeei, in Bokora county and Tepeth, Nadunget and Rupa in Matheniko county. It was necessary to take samples from these categories in order to have a balanced view and data since understanding the question of effective service delivery in and around Moroto District involves more actors other than the local communities<sup>5</sup>.

### 3.3 Sample size

Due to the nature of study and the difficulty of employing random sampling, it was necessary to choose purposively, a representative sample of one hundred respondents from the total population of 182,560 in Bokora and Matheniko counties. One parish each from the selected sub counties was chosen as representative sample. A blend of both sub counties situated close to the urban centers and enjoying better social services namely Matany and Nadunget together with those that are far off from the social services specifically Rupa, Tepeth and Lopeei were chosen for comparative study purposes. Of the sampled one hundred respondents, only seventy one were able to return their questionnaires. In addition, the researcher targeted individuals who have knowledge on matters of service delivery and the history of security in the region. The table on pg.50 indicates the sampled categories and the number and sex of respondents.

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<sup>5</sup>At the time of the study, in 2007, Moroto District covered both Bokora and Matheniko counties before it was sub-divided into Moroto mainly composed of Matheniko and Napak composed of Bokora County in 2009.

**Table 1:- Sample categories, No. and sex of respondents (N=71)**

Sample Categories	Number of Respondents	
	Male	Female
Two Focus Group Discussions of local community (Each comprising 8 respondents) – including a control group from Nakapiripirit district	9	7
Key informants from members of the community – 4 elders from each of the sampled sub counties	10	5
Key informants from Government/Security Personnel	16	4
Key informants Civil society organizations	4	6
Questionnaires were administered randomly to other key informants	7	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>25</b>

(Source: - Primary data)

### **3.4 Data collection instruments**

#### **3.4.1 Secondary data collection instruments**

This involved collection of information from books, documents, magazines and newspapers. In this study the researcher obtained data from previous academic literature from Makerere University library, the district offices, Internet, Newspapers and Magazines. This part of the research was targeting information on historical background, past policies of development in Karamoja and documented critiques of development and security in Karamoja. Documents from civil society organizations in Moroto and Kampala, including Office of the Prime Minister helped with data which was used in identifying the gaps that were bridged by the research.

#### **3.4.2 The primary data collection instruments**

This key research instruments included key informants' interview schedules, Focus Group Discussion guides, and observational data form.

**(a) Focus Group Discussion guides** – This included discussion guides for **sixteen** members of the local community respondents in form of two group sessions.

**(b) Questionnaire** – **Ten** pre-coded questionnaires were used since these types of questionnaires could solicit quantitative data in a linear manner. In addition, they reduced the cost of data processing. The questionnaire was pre-tested in Matany sub-county to allow the researcher revise/add/reformulate/omit the questions. Pre-testing also assisted in estimating the time needed for the interviews.

**(c) Interviews** – The researcher interviewed other categories namely the government/security officers, civil society organizations and twenty individual members of the local community and other respondents.

**(d) Observation** - In this technique, the information was sought by way of the investigator making his own observation on the existing social services and security issues. Whereas this was not the main technique to be used for data collection, it was used as supplement to observe, interpret and explain the quantitative data collected using questionnaire. The researcher is Ekarimjongait and has an informed understanding of Moroto district. He had grown up in the district, taking the opportunity to observe service delivery in relation to conflict.

### **3.5 Procedure of data collection**

The research took **fourteen** months, **seven** months (November 2006 – May 2007) of which were for desk research, **two** months (June and July 2007) for field research and **five** months (August to December) for data analysis and report writing. After seeking permission from the district administration, the researcher then commenced the field research covering the above mentioned target groups.

### **3.6. Reliability of the Instruments**

According to Trochim (2005), reliability has to do with the quality of measurement. Reliability is the “consistency” or “repeatability” of one’s instruments, namely that applying the same procedure in the same way will always produce the same measure. In a bid to ensure reliability, interviews and questionnaires were conducted with different categories of respondents in order to generate a balanced view.

The reliability of the questionnaire was tested using statistical package for social scientists (SPSS) and the Chronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient was 0.82. This showed an improvement after modifications to the questionnaire during the pre-test.

### **3.7. Validity of the Instruments**

Esaiasson, et al (2003:16) defines validity in one or three ways: - agreement between theoretical definition and operational indicators, absence of systematic mistakes and that we measure what we say we measure. Concerning validity, the researcher set out to measure the relationship between service delivery and conflict transformation through piloting pre-coded questionnaires in order to ensure that salient issues of the study were captured and incorporated in the final questionnaire.

### **3.8 Data analysis**

Because the research includes statistical and qualitative approaches, the researcher used statistical and descriptive methods to analyze these data. From interviews, focus group discussion and observation, themes and categories were identified in relations to the objectives of

the research. Then there was analysis geared towards tracing relationships among the socio-political phenomena regarding the question of effective service delivery as a strategy for conflict transformation in Moroto district.

Percentages and tables were used to summarize data statistically and content analysis for qualitative data.

### **3.9 Research Constraints**

#### **(a) The sensitivity of the topic**

Since the topic is about pastoral conflict and the state, it is sensitive especially on the side of security officers, government officials or various organizations working in Karamoja at the time when disarmament is being conducted in the region. Some respondents were not free enough to respond fully. Secondly, some officers thought that when they talk about security matters then they would be revealing the failures of the government in securing the pastoralists. Hence this explains why the results show 71% rate of response which is not as such an adequate response rate. The researcher reassured the respondents of the confidentiality of their responses.

#### **(b) Transport and communication**

As was explained in the background to the study, there is dire scarcity of the regular means of transport within the district. The common means of transport within the region is '*Dynas*' (open lorry-type vehicles commonly used for transportation of produce and livestock). They are not scheduled at all, and they are not a pleasant means of transport around the district where roads are murram and susceptible to heavy rains and prone to ambushes by cattle rustlers and road thugs. Secondly given the necessity to set appointments for informant's interviews and the focus group discussions, it was imperative that the investigator gives advance notice of his traveling

schedule to the officers assisting with mobilization. Unfortunately, the signal for communication by the mobile telephones was not very clear in Moroto.

The two problems above are again related to lack of social services in the district. However, the researcher used connections with district/organizational personnel who had a radio call facility connected to some organization or mainly missionary establishments in particular locations, as a means of overcoming this challenge. He was able also to travel on 300 km road although was not able to collect all the data from twenty nine of the proposed respondents

**(c) Inadequate female voices**

The patriarchal social setting of Moroto district in particular and Karamoja in general tends to dictate that women's participation is subsumed in the men's submission, thus the female voices were not easy to capture in the research. This is explained in the 36% composition of the respondents as female as opposed to 64% were male. However, there were efforts made to encourage women voices in the research, particularly in the civil society organizations.

**CHAPTER FOUR**  
**PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS**  
**ON SERVICE DELIVERY IN MOROTO**

**4.0 Introduction**

This chapter has focused on the characteristics of service delivery in Moroto district. This “narrowing” of the observation angle allows us to get into the in-depth of the problem of service delivery. The chapter shows the policy framework in place, nature of roads and water sectors by characteristics such as type of roads and water sources, adequacy, duration of water availability, maintenance of roads and water sources, level of community involvement in service delivery process cycle.

Frequencies and percentages were used to describe the characteristics of service delivery as viewed by the seventy one respondents in the sample (41 from the community and the other 30 from representatives of Local government and other actors working with the sampled community). The background characteristics of road and water services were necessary for further analysis of the effects of the existing services on conflict transformation in Moroto district.


**4.1 Policy framework that governs interventions**

An examination of the policy frameworks was fundamental to relate them to current and past conflict transformation strategies. When key respondents were asked whether they know of any policy framework that governs interventions in the district, 26 of them representing 79% affirmed having knowledge about the policy framework, while 7 (21%) admitted that they do not

have any knowledge of such policy frameworks. Figure 1, below shows that a reasonably important part of the population is aware of what is guiding development in the region.

For Civil society organizations and government officials, 53% alluded to having knowledge of policy framework that governs social service delivery which includes amongst others: - PEAP (1997) that was revised after three years; decentralization policy (1995) and others like UPE and USE. However, 21% expressed lack of awareness of any such policy guidelines. This shows that a proportion of government officers and civil society organizations, who are supposed to lead the people, are playing a leadership role blindly, without being conversant with development policies.

**Figure 1:- Knowledge of Policy frameworks for service delivery**



(Source: - Primary data)

These findings testify that most interventions in the district have guiding frameworks which are known to a significant number of beneficiaries. However, there is need of carrying out a massive awareness campaign for every programme that is to be implemented in the region because there should be a critical mass of people who are aware of policies to foster development initiatives.




#### **4.1.1 The effect of international and regional policies on peace and service delivery**

When the key respondents were asked whether the international and regional policies and actions affect peace situation, 33% were affirmative while 55% negated the statement. This finding implies that many of the respondents do not quite know the effect that regional and global trends have on peace and yet in reality, world over, global policies have a tremendous effect on peace at the local level. On the other hand, 39% of the key informants indicated that the international and regional policies affect service delivery while 51% said they do not. Like the effect of international and regional policies on peace, any policy passed has an impact on service delivery. If for example, most of the donor funds are channeled into delivery of soft ware (capacity building), even if the direct beneficiaries' view was expressing other needs, many programmes will be tailored towards training rather than infrastructural development.

#### **4.1.2 Relationship between International/Regional policies and Government policies**

When key respondents were asked whether there was any disagreement between policies for regional security and Ugandan government arrangement in protection of local communities, their responses, as captured in Figure 2 on pg. 45 indicated that, 42% affirmed the proposition while 52% refuted it. This implies that the national trends often follow the regional and international policies and the two cannot be divorced. This is affirmed in the illustration on figure 2. Where the 52% of respondents affirmed that there is no disagreement between national and international policies.

**Figure 2:- Disagreement between policies for regional security and GoU protection of local communities**



## **4.2 Social Service delivery**

### **4.2.1 Source of water for daily use in the households**

Of the 34 respondents from the communities sampled, 29% indicated they were using public tap/piped outside their dwelling as the source of water while the other 71% indicated they use unprotected well/river/pond/stream. Given the prolonged droughts, reliance on livestock and the attendant demand for pasture and water, it is apparent that conflicts abound as the community moves in search of water. In addition, the findings show a strong divide between urban and peri-urban populations since tap/piped water is predominantly common in the urban settings. On average, the distance of the water source from the homestead was 2.8 Km which is quite far for women and girls who mainly are engaged in water collection.

According to Moroto water supply summary report of June 2007, the district service coverage is 53.7% and the deep borehole functionality rate 67.1% with about 46% expected population not served. This shows that almost 50% of the population is not accessing boreholes, a situation which requires a lot of effort to reverse.

With regards to the duration of water availability and alternatives, 39% of the respondents alluded to water availability for less than six months while 30% indicated that the pattern of water is seasonal or uncertain, with a paltry 18% indicating that they had water available throughout the year. Concerning the alternative sources of water for daily use in the households, 42% of the respondents pointed out that it was springs/ponds/unprotected wells, while 18% stated that they used far off boreholes as an alternative source of water. These statistics indicate that there is a very high percentage of water insecurity which gives rise to the violent struggle for scarce resources. To corroborate the state of water, 36% of respondents from Civil Society Organizations and the Government, indicated that it was adequate while 64% indicated that it was inadequate. The adequacy of water or lack of it was attributed to the following reasons as tabulated on table 2 below:-

**Table 2:- Rationale for adequacy or inadequacy of water**

<b>Adequate</b>	<b>Inadequate</b>
Water sources are being rehabilitated and ponds desilted by NGOs	The area/terrain makes it difficult for allow drilling or rehabilitation of water sources
For human settlements	Inadequate for livestock and production and a great proportion of the population still depend on pond water
Through NUSAF, many boreholes have been drilled and windmills are still being constructed	Lack of facilitation for maintenance of water sources e.g. 21 valley dams in the district were constructed but only 5 of them are operational leave alone poorly distributed


*(Source: - Primary data)*

Owing to insecurity, inadequate maintenance and community migration, 48 water sources (representing 10%) all over the district have been abandoned or have fallen into disuse.

#### 4.2.2 Road and communication network

The nature of the road network that connects communities to social centers was examined and the findings are presented in figure 3 below.

**Figure 3:- Nature of the road network that connects communities to social centers**




*(Source: Primary data)*

On the road network that connects communities to any social center, 45% of the respondents indicated that it is the murram road that connects them while the other 55% alluded to being connected by feeder roads and foot paths. Murram road connections tend to be impassable during bad weather times, namely during heavy rains and floods and this is the reason why communities get cut off for some time from social services. During such periods, market opportunities are lost for communities who rely on murram and feeder roads because they are not navigable and in addition ability to intervene in conflicts is curtailed, that is, the security is incapable of quickly responding to attacks on the communities located in inaccessible areas.

# MAP OF MOROTO DISTRICT SHOWING ROADS UNDER CENTRAL WORKS

## MOROTO STATION




**Table 3:- National road network status**

NATIONAL ROAD NETWORK STATUS (BY STATION AND REGION)					
SN	STATION	REGION	LENGTH (1(M)		
			Paved	Unpaved	Total
1	Arua	Northern	134	412	546
2	Fort Portal	Western	169	397	565
3	Gulu	Northern	81	578	659
4	Hoima	Western	0	395	395
5	Jinja	Eastern	214	407	620
6	Kabale	Western	158	255	413
7	Kampala	Central	406	264	670
8	Kasese	Western	130	217	347
9	Kitgum	Northern	0	501	501
10	Kotido	Eastern	0	414	414
11	Lira	Northern	95	445	540
12	Luwero	Central	185	321	506
13	Masaka	Central	231	297	528
14	Masindi	Western	90	385	475
15	Mbale	Eastern	229	337	565
16	Mbarara	Western	294	525	819
17	Moroto	Eastern	0	347	347
18	Moyo	Northern	0	161	161
19	Mpigi	Central	149	338	487
20	Mubende	Central	118	249	367
21	Soroti	Eastern	48	407	455
22	Tororo	Eastern	117	256	373
TOTAL			2,847	7,906	10,753
<div>26%74%</div> <b>NB:- ALL UNPAVED ROADS ARE GRAVEL SURFACED</b>					

(Source: - Ministry of Works, Housing and Communications)

#### 4.2.3 Community involvement

**Figure 4:- Level of maintenance of the road and communication network**



(Source: - Primary data)

Seventy nine percent of the Civil Society and Government officials supported the fact that the road and communication network was inadequate, while 13% stated that it was adequate. This finding corroborates that in *figure 4* above and implies that the social services cannot easily be availed to the local communities. The level of community involvement in road and communication maintenance is also low and this is attributable to the fact that there is lack of inclusiveness of the local communities in the construction of roads.

The table 4 on Pg. 51, tabulates the dichotomy between adequacy of road network or lack of it and attempts to capture the fact that the study tended to compare the respondents' views depending on their accessibility to the road network or not.

**Table 4:- Rationale for adequacy or inadequacy of road network**

<b>Adequate</b>	<b>Inadequate</b>
A number of vehicles plying these routes	Inefficiency of the local governments manifested by infrequent maintenance and use of inappropriate construction materials for culverts
Motorable during dry season	Rural and security roads and bridges are impassable during the rainy season
Currently the roads are being graded	The stakeholders are not involved in the maintenance

*(Source: - Primary data)*

Of those who said there is some level of road and communication network maintenance, 33% alluded to community involvement in the maintenance while the other 67% indicated that the community is not involved in the maintenance of the roads. This implies that communities measure their involvement in terms of the level of direct participation in road construction and maintenance works through provision of manual labour or even being sub-contracted to carry out particular works.


Thirty percent of the respondents indicated having developed or initiated works on road and communication network. However, 60% of those who have not engaged in the road works attributed their non engagement to the rigidity of the local government structures while 10% attributed it to inadequate cooperative efforts by all the actors, particularly the development partners' support. The development of the road unit on average takes 6 months. This implies that there ought to be a level of meaningful collaboration of all actors together with the community for road works to be maintained regularly and on time.



### 4.3 International NGOs and service delivery

According to the respondents, the international NGOs play a limited role in the area of service delivery. This role entails raising funds for the various service delivery projects and funding projects through Government and local NGOs e.g. Cooperation and Development has been drilling boreholes for communities, while WFP has been giving food for assets (maintenance of the feeder roads and support to sub-county plans).

**Figure 5:- International NGOs and Service delivery in Moroto District**




(Source: - Primary data)

In the illustration on *figure 5* above, 33% of service delivery interventions of international NGOs in Moroto district is composed of delivery of software in the form of training workshops/trainings as opposed to 30% hardware delivery which mainly includes small scale projects drilling of boreholes and support to road sector. This leaves a considerable portion of maintenance of community services (37%) under the local government and other less predictable well-wishers.

#### 4.4 Local NGOs and service delivery in Moroto

Local NGOs have to a lesser extent got involved in the provision of social services and mainly given a hand in maintenance of services.

**Figure 6:- Local NGOs and service delivery in Moroto District**




(Source: - Primary data)

In the *figure 6* above, local civil society organizations greatly engage in mobilization of local communities and in conducting capacity building workshops for the local communities: community training covers topics like borehole repairs and conducting needs assessments.

#### 4.5 Improvement/Degradation in service delivery in Moroto District

While government and many actors boast of availability of social services in Moroto, this research examined the level of changes for better or for worse in the service delivery.

**Figure 7:- State of Service delivery in Moroto District**



(Source: - Primary data)

From the figure 7 above, a majority of respondents indicated that, on the whole there was general degradation of services as evidenced in the desire of many people to flock the urban centers, where they believe there are better services and the frequency with which infrastructure is being rehabilitated after construction. Given the strain on decentralization of services, the 56% respondents who indicated an overall degradation in social services in the district, advanced the following reasons:- the existence of a few functional boreholes and many impassable road networks; the district structures that tends to contradict and create confusion within the local community structures; low rate of redress of the widespread poverty, disease and illiteracy; escalating conflicts and insecurity and scanty/inadequate information on levels of service delivery.

#### **4.6 Effect of the level of service delivery on the work of CSOs and Government operations**


Seventeen respondents representing 57% indicated that the current level of service delivery contributes towards delays or demotivates them in the provision of other social services, while 6 (20%) stated that the level of inadequacy forces people to migrate to other areas for water and thus increases susceptibility to diseases. Two (7%) stated that it contributes towards insecurity since it increases susceptibility to road banditry. Five (17%) alluded to the fact that this affects the level of community mobilization.

The above findings show a direct correlation between the level of service delivery and the commitment of CSOs and government to their work, no wonder most of the government and CSO offices are located in urban areas with adequate social services. In addition, in an interview with the researcher, one respondent representing a government department confessed that many staff are reluctant to assume duty stations in administrative units far from urban centers, even those who eventually accept do so only when there is an incentive. Therefore, in order to create a multiplier effect on service delivery, there is need to rehabilitate the existing ones (water sources and roads).

#### **4.7 Appropriate service delivery framework and mechanism**

Figure 8 on page 56, gives a summary of interventions envisaged to advance the capability of improving service delivery in Moroto district. The highest priority needs to be given to increased budgetary support to service delivery and this way, security concerns will be addressed. However, this framework also relies upon a concurrent pursuit of peace building initiatives which are participatory.

**Figure 8: Review areas for service delivery**



*(Source: Primary data)*


#### **4.8 Planning of service delivery**

**Forty two** respondents representing 59% indicated that there is some level of planning for service delivery carried out in Moroto district, while 12 of them representing 16% alluded to no planning for service delivery, the other 17 (29%) either had no idea of any planning for service delivery or didn't respond to the question. Of those in the local community who said there was some planning for service delivery, 50% indicated that this was basically through local government departments, while 29% indicated that these plans are made centrally, 15% attributed to the use of consultants and the other 6% stated that the plans are generated in partnership with all the stakeholders.

The findings above emphasize the need for community involvement in the entire project cycle. Unfortunately, even those respondents who had an idea of some level of planning indicated that it was basically done for them by the local and central governments rather than in close collaboration with the beneficiary communities.

#### 4.9 Community participation in service delivery

**Figure 9: Community vision of participation in service delivery**



*(Source: Primary data)*

When asked about the level of community participation and involvement in service delivery, the respondents indicated the following as the advantages that accrue from consulting stakeholders:-


- Community priorities will be addressed
- People get responsible for both achievements and mischief of the project
- Easy resource mobilization
- Empowerment of the communities and ownership of project assets
- Transparency, accountability and sustainability of the project
- Encouragement of positive participation
- Bridges the gap between communities and project implementers in service delivery
- Promotes partnership

Despite the advantages that accrue from community participation in service delivery, figure 9, above indicates that there is a low level of community involvement in service delivery.

Community participation is vital for the success of service delivery because this empowers communities since there is ownership of the project and follow-up action.

#### 4.10:- Ways of reforming community participation in the service delivery

**Figure 10: Reforming Community actions in service delivery**



*(Source: Primary data)*

The respondents viewed consultation and actual participation in the project cycle as a way of eliciting community participation in service delivery. While many stakeholders (Government and CSOs) alluded to engaging communities during the project cycle, it is evident that they usually create avenues for selling their ideas to the communities rather than enabling the communities to originate what they view will work. Other ways of eliciting community participation include sensitization and provision of employment to the communities as opposed to consulting and bringing all the manpower from outside the communities.


#### 4.11. Challenges of linking development and service delivery

When the civil society organizations and local government respondents were asked to identify the challenges of linking development and service delivery, 40% of them stated that it was insecurity and conflict of core values meanwhile 36% alluded to the fact that policy structure is

not supportive in terms of bureaucratic and inadequate planning procedures and the other 24% stated that it was mainly insufficient sustainability of interventions resulting from lack of community sensitization and involvement which has been wrongly interpreted as negative attitudes towards work.

Several interventions into Karamoja have failed to yield due to the perception that the beneficiary communities possess negative attitudes. The research therefore broadened the common thinking that insecurity is the main challenge to development to include elements like inhibitive policy structures and lack of sustainability of interventions.

**Figure 11: Challenges of linking development and service delivery**



*(Source: Primary data)*

In order to overcome the challenges to development and service delivery mentioned above, policy makers need to reexamine the policy procedures in an attempt to reduce bureaucratic tendencies and together with the local communities explore sustainable ways of providing and safeguarding security.



The existing infrastructure in Moroto district, road network and water, is inadequate owing to poor government policies that are insensitive to pastoralism as an alternative livelihood. Appropriate service delivery framework and mechanism crucial for infrastructural development will be one that recognizes the circumstances under which interventions are carried out and engages the local people throughout project cycle.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS ON CONFLICT IN MOROTO


#### 5.0 Introduction

This chapter has focused on the characteristics of conflict in Moroto district, the causes and effects to the people, the link between service delivery and conflict, governments' attempts to deal with the problem and community entry points in participating to bring about the required transformation of society.

#### 5.1 Security situation in Moroto

As shown in figure 12, below when the respondents were asked to rate the place of security in Moroto, 97% of them indicated that it was very critical, while a paltry 3% stated that it was not very critical.

**Figure 12: Security situation in Moroto**



*(Source: Primary data)*

The findings above indicated a high level of conflict sensitivity of people, many of whom have in one way or another lost property and relatives to insecurity.

## **5.2. Forms and causes of insecurity**

The three categories of the respondents, namely, the local community/key informants, the government officials and the civil society organizations (international NGOs and Local NGOs) had different understanding about the forms of insecurity. However, 34% of the respondents were in agreement that the dominant form is interethnic cattle thefts which have been a characteristic of the district and is always attributed to the practice of heavy dowry requirements for marriage. Other forms of insecurity include:- mismanagement of disarmament exercise (inadequate sensitization of the local communities) and improper management of conflict resolution mechanisms (20%), road ambushes owing to the set up of the district and poor road network (20%), famine or food insecurity or drought including unemployment and inability to cater for the needs which conditions people to move to other districts in search of pasture, money, livelihood (20%) while 4% attributed it to contract killings or innocent murders carried out by some people.

Related to the above, 50% of the respondents indicated that insecurity is caused by the harsh climate; meanwhile 32% attributed it to negative traditional practices. However, others causes mentioned include proliferation of small arms and corruption, shared by 18% of the respondents.

The implication of the above findings is that the harsh climate has led the predominantly pastoral community in Moroto district to rely mainly on livestock. The heavy reliance on livestock has orchestrated violent cultural practices (cattle thefts) which have been complicated the proliferation of small arms.

In relation to the above, when the key respondents were asked whether the Karimojong are viewed as a national threat, 21 of them, representing 64% rejected the assertion while 11 (34%) agreed with the assertion. On enquiring further, about their perception of themselves as a


national threat, 94% stated that they did not perceive themselves as a national threat, while only 3% agreed that they perceived themselves as a national security threat.

The attitudes that develop as a result of the perception and stereotyping about the people of Moroto district influence the level of intra-district and cross border relations. As a result, there is a clear cut dichotomy between the rest of Uganda and Karamoja in general and Moroto in particular. This greatly affects the interventions into Moroto district and promotes further conflicts.

### 5.3. Economic and socio-political effects of conflict

The greatest effect of conflict, economically, according to 75% of the respondents was pegged to low development which is characterized by the disruption of business activities and service delivery, idleness and the resultant influx of the able bodied workforce into urban centers and movement to the neighbouring districts for pasture and water. The respondents stressed that there was no food in the communities due to insecure fertile areas, low productivity as a result of confinement and the reluctance of farmers to invest in livestock. Other effects that were alluded to by 25% of the respondents included high cost of goods and services and loss and destruction of property and livestock.

**Figure 13: Effects of insecurity on daily life**



(Source: Primary data)

Apart from the effects on human and property protection, the fear/suspicion and uncertainty which is a direct product of conflict creates mistrust and lack of confidence in the formal structures and institutions that have been tasked with ensuring security. A fearful and uncertain environment inhibits productivity and orchestrates violence.

Socio-politically, 52% of the key respondents indicated that insecurity has to a greatest extent led to the regional isolation of Moroto District, poor community interactions, restricted movement of its people and livestock and all the Karimojong being labeled “warriors”, a derogatory and demeaning terminology. Thirty percent of the respondents pointed out that many professionals in various fields have had to leave Moroto with the resultant delay in service delivery and 18% of them saying that insecurity has contributed towards a threat to live and eventual loss of lives.

The effects of conflict on Moroto district are far out reaching. The level of infrastructural development and the way other communities view the Karimojong is attributed to the amount of security that prevails in that environment.

#### **5.4. Role of Government in providing security**

Seventy ninety percent of the key respondents indicated that government plays a key role in providing security to the local people in a variety of ways ranging from creation of army detachments and deployment of UPDF in sub counties, night patrols and disarmament. Meanwhile, 21% alluded to the fact that there is hardly any government intervention and if any it is not timely. This implies that government’s interventions in the provision of security are mainly militaristic and lacking in multi-pronged approach. An examination of the 2001/02 disarmament

exercise in Moroto reveals initial success which fell short of sustainability because it lacked an answer to the root cause of armament.

When the 21% who stated that there is no government intervention in provision of security were asked which other agents provide security, they said that it is the youth who use local weapons like bows and arrows and the local community themselves. Unfortunately, the effect of the youth leaving communities to do odd jobs in urban centers has drained away these 'safety nets'. Coupled with the insufficient security provided by government security agents, the role of government in securing communities is at stake.

### **5.5. Link between service delivery and insecurity**

On whether there is a linkage between service delivery and security, 70% of the respondents indicated that there is a strong linkage between the two, while 27% were not sure whether there is any linkage and a paltry 3% indicated that there is no relationship. When asked to explain this response, those who alluded to the strong linkage stated that there is insecurity where social infrastructure are poorly developed since security agencies cannot move to affected areas in a bid to avert calamities and so services cannot be developed meaningfully. They also pointed out that there would be no adequate follow up since those who are willing to help fear to lose their lives. It has also hindered investment in the service delivery as development partners who would have injected funds for provision of water and road construction have been scared away.

Poor service delivery or struggle for limited resources hinder quick response to insecurity, for example poor road and water distribution makes it hard for one to reach out to communities during the dry season for sensitization and other development initiatives. That is to say, lack of

water forces pastoralists to move temporarily to neighbouring districts in search of water and pastures. Some said that under the guise of insecurity, hides other economic threats like corruption. It was indicated that both are sources of underdevelopment.

As though to confirm the linkage between service delivery and insecurity, when the key respondents were asked to identify aspects that contribute towards peace and development, 66% of them indicated that delivery of social services was fundamental, while 22% underlined the need to put a lot of efforts towards participatory disarmament as opposed to the cordon and search method which is currently in use and is riddled by human rights abuses. Out of the remaining 22%, most of them indicated the importance of peaceful demonstrations and coordinated efforts on disarmament and delivery of social services, while a small portion of the respondents recommended the promotion of microfinance institutions to avail people with loans.

## **5.6. Conflict sensitivity in the provision of social services**

Service delivery in the past was more efficient for example the colonial government had sunk boreholes in most of the grazing areas to allow livestock keepers water their animals easily. This efficiently could be attributed partly to the small size of population but partly to cohesive nature of the communities as the traditional modes of governance bound communities. However, due to insensitive planning, most boreholes nowadays are being sunk near urban centers or to specific locations dictated by a few dominant politicians oblivious of the common good.

When the government officials and civil society organizations were asked whether their objectives in the provision of services to the local population are conflict sensitive, 63% affirmed

the statement while 37% did not seem to comprehend the integration of the notion of conflict sensitivity in service delivery.

Conflict sensitivity refers to the need to recognize the potential impact of interventions on conflict dynamics and shaping interventions in such a way as to avoid inadvertently fueling divisions and grievances. Programmes implemented in conflict and post conflict areas sometimes tend to create more conflict. One would argue that lack of ability to comprehend and incorporate conflict sensitivity explains why interventions and programmes have been designed for Moroto district but from the study, it seems the situation is seemingly unchanged.


### **5.7 Conflict transformation strategies**

When the respondents were asked to state whether they witness any efforts towards conflict transformation, 82% of them indicated they see visibly efforts towards conflict transformation through the activities of Civil society organizations (KADEP, MONARLIP, Riamiriam Civil society Network, IRC, KOPEIN, MADEFO) Religious institutions, traditional leaders, Security agencies (UPDF), Law enforcement agencies (Police, prisons), Local governments, the '*Karachuna*' and the Uganda Human Rights Commission.

The conflict transformation projects of civil society organizations which work in the communities was more highlighted and can be seen, although their presence in the field tends to be proportional to the funding they receive. The law enforcement agencies and UPDF together with local governments have been curtailed by the policy constraints and insufficient facilitation to engage in conflict transformation.



**Figure 14: Peace building strategies**



*(Source: Primary data)*

Figure 14, above shows that 25% of the key respondents representing 76% proposed consistent (guided by clear rules and regulations) and well coordinated disarmament (open and defined involvement of each of the stakeholders with clearly stipulated roles and responsibilities) disarmament as an activity that greatly contribute towards security in Moroto district. But they hastened to add that it should be preceded by peace meetings (mental disarmament) and should be more involving of the communities and well managed. The other 3 respondents (10%) suggested that deployment of security agents in human habitat, securing the source of ammunition and promotion of community policing guided by punitive measures. Six percent postulated strengthening and promoting civil society Organizations efforts while another 3% suggested Provision of vocational skills could help. The other security arrangements suggested include among others; - support to the education of the Karimojong children and especially the girl-child, as a preventive measure; effective service delivery in form of good access road network.

Although 76% of the key respondents strongly supported disarmament, when they were asked later how suitable it was in ushering security, 15 of the respondents, representing 48%, stated that it was not suitable because of gross violation of human rights in the process; inadequate sensitization and community mobilization and involvement of other stakeholders like legitimate local and traditional leadership and Civil Society Organizations.

Disarmament has ended up being unsustainable since it has adopted the use excessive force without guaranteeing security for the people as it has exposed them to attacks from neighbouring groups while the inadequately remunerated agents watch on; optimism about the peaceful process of talking to people to cooperate has been ignored. Henceforth, there is a clash between the existing arrangement of disarmament and the native approach of problem solving culminating into fear of rural areas owing to the dreaded cordon and search operations which have forced people to take refuge in urban centers with the resultant rural-urban migration.

On the other hand 52% (16) affirmed that the disarmament exercise was suitable owing to the resultant reduction in road ambushes and relative calm or peace. They also note, positively, that it has been accompanied by the creation of communal grazing with the protection of the security agents. It also made it possible for development to take place.


From the foregoing findings, by and large, a well thought out, comprehensive and participatory disarmament exercise for Moroto in particular and Karamoja region in general, is a welcome programme. The study findings suggest that this should be informed by the lessons learnt from the previous experiences and should attempt to answer the root cause of proliferation of small arms. From the respondents' views, the success of the proposed peace building arrangements is hinged on the full participation of all stakeholders and the provision of better social services to the community and support to alternative livelihoods.

## 5.8. Disarmament; missing links and prerequisites for success

Seventy six percent of the key respondents confirmed that they were not involved in the process of disarmament, with only 9% affirming that they were involved only at the stage of mobilizing communities to cooperate with the security agents. The findings underline the importance of engaging all the stakeholders from the onset of the programme to the end and not selectively during bits of the process of disarmament.

On the timing of the disarmament exercise, 79% stated that the exercise was not well timed while 15% indicated that it was rightly timed. Of those who indicated that the timing was poor (as captured in the graph below), 45% blamed the lack of planning. In fact, the current use of cordon and search operation has faced a lot of criticisms owing to the high handedness of the security agents involved. There was hardly any uniformity and the fact that it did not seem to address the root cause of armament complicated the operations. Thirty three percent attributed the failures of the exercise to lack of community sensitization and involvement and the other 22% blamed the fault on the ruthlessness with which it was carried out leaving many people dead, maimed, raped and pillaging of property.


**Figure 15: Missing links in the disarmament exercise**



*(Source: primary data)*

Proceeding from the pitfalls of disarmament that has been postured as the answer to the peace building which contributes towards the broader picture of conflict transformation, 30% of the key respondents suggested that provision of massive and relevant education capable of opening avenues for employment opportunities would be an answer. They also suggested programmes of practical education, which instills skills that build the potential of the reformed warrior youth to engage in productive work. The proposed training included brick-laying, carpentry, apiary, poultry keeping, as income generating activities that have the power to enable the youth generate income and divert their attention from cattle rustling.

**Figure 16: Prerequisites for success in disarmament**



*(Source: Primary data)*

The role of the institution of Council of Elders in the whole of Karamoja has been so crucial in the history of this community. This institution is composed of respectable elders in a given community whose counsel is held in highest esteem. It is along this line that 30% of the respondents recommended the strengthening of traditional mechanisms of governance in a way that allows their potential to be tapped into and blended with the modern system of governance.

Twenty one percent of the respondents were able to cite the role of community mobilization and sensitization in as a method of peace building, while 19% of them underlined the need for continuous dialogue between parties. The local government – civil society organization

partnership was emphasized as a structure that can strongly deliver on community mobilization in a bid to build consensus and create a conducive atmosphere for dialogue to succeed.


The pre-requisites for peace building according to the respondents are captured in figure 4.9 and they rotate around comprehensive interventions that go beyond the talk.

### 5.9. Traditional methods of peace building

Before the advent of the contemporary conflict resolution mechanisms, pastoralist communities and their neighbours had their own time-tested means of resolving local level disputes based on aged-old customs of mutual respect and Complementarity. Conflicts rested on solid traditional institutions like the council of elders where long practiced and decisions respected by all communities.

When the respondents were asked whether they have traditional methods of conflict transformation, 70% expressed knowledge of typically traditional mechanisms of resolving conflict while 12% said they didn't have an idea of search methods and the remaining 18% did give any response at all.

**Figure 17: Traditional mechanisms for conflict transformation**



Of various mechanisms identified, 30% of the respondents underlined the use of ‘*Ekokwa*’ which is a special meeting attended by all members of the community and aimed at addressing a particular issue arising in a community. Each community uses this forum to mitigate common problems that do not need other parties. Issues normally addressed by ‘*Ekokwa*’ include among others; - domestic problems, petty thefts and disrespect of the elders.

Twenty one percent of the key informants said ‘*Akiriket*’ which is an elder’s council (exclusive of women) who deliberate on any happening in the community. This provides a forum for the larger part of the community to meet and find a solution to problems of a bigger magnitude, like; inter ethnic conflicts, defiance of a group of youth who may engage in cattle rustling, seeking for solutions to mitigate natural calamities. Coupled with ‘*Akiriket*’, cultural ceremonies (marriage, initiation, naming of a child) accompanied by educative and meaningful songs and dance for specific occasions, are employed to mitigate conflict.



*Community owning the project: - Brokering peace between communities (Photo by The IRC)*

Of last resort is ‘*Ameto*’ which had 6% of the key informants postulating it as formidable mechanism which is mainly a disciplinary measure aimed at ensuring that youth who are apprehended or implicated in wrong doing are communally subjected to punishment or fine or assigned to carry out community sanctioned activities.

#### **5.10. Coordination and collaboration of efforts with other actors**


When all the respondents were asked to show whether they have ever witnessed any coordination and collaboration with other actors in the area of peace and development, 51% of them indicated that there were efforts evident and with mainly civil society organizations which include among others – WFP, UNICEF, KADEP, MADEFO, UNDP, NUSAF, MONARLIP, Cooperation and development, Riamiriam Civil Society Network, Faith Based Organizations, IRC, ADOL, EU, Danida, OCODI, ARELIMOK, KOPEIN, AWE, KISP, Human Rights Commission, Uganda Police, Minority Agency International, Local Government departments, FAO, Community groups, KPIU. However 15% stated that they never collaborated with any other stakeholder while 34% of them had no response at all.

Participatory methods of conflict transformation and involvement of communities can be evidenced mainly in community Based organizations like KADEP, MADEFO, MORNALIP, KISP, ARELIMOK, and KOPEIN. These organizations have succeeded in their implementation of conflict transformation programme, with deliverables being relative peace after dialogues conducted, because of their flexibility and constant consultations with local communities.

### 5.11. Multi-sectoral approach to Peace and development in Moroto district

On areas or strategies of collaboration or cooperation, 64% of the respondents (mainly key respondents) were quick to indicate that it entailed bottom up approaches. In specific terms, these approaches include Mobilization and sensitization through direct consultations with the local communities (meetings), role plays - music dance and drama, talk shows and early warning mechanisms which entail information sharing with the stakeholders. Meanwhile, 16% of the respondents, mainly from Civil Society Organizations' and Government officials added the component of Needs assessment or rural appraisal and use of community structures like the Local Councils. Coupled with the above, report sharing and mainstreaming of cross cutting issues into the activities were also being used. However, 15% of the aggregate respondents had no response to this question. The percentage of no response can partly be explained by the low levels of literacy in the district.

**Figure 18: Multi-sectoral approach to peace and development**



(Source: Primary data)

Despite the recognition of the use of bottom up approaches to peace and development, there are subtle forces that militate against it. The local communities have ended up being used as rubber stamp to certain actions owing to low levels of literacy since their attendance of meetings is



construed to mean acceptance or sanctioning planned activities. Even the partnerships alluded to tend to be ‘marriage of convenience’ or avenues to show case/pretend that communities are involved.


When respondents were asked what they would do differently if given an opportunity, 32% of them said that they would embark on economic empowerment of Ngikarimojong. Twenty three percent suggested that social services provision could be given the priority. Meanwhile, 18% suggested massive investment in education and the remaining 27% suggested that they would go for properly planned disarmament and protection of the local communities.

The findings above show the trend of adaptation of a multi-sectoral approach to peace and development. There should be an emphasis on provision and improvement of service delivery as a foundation stone for peace and development rather than going for programmes like delivery of software, whose impact cannot be easily captured.

#### **5.16. Cross cutting issues**

Figure 19, on pg. 77 presents findings on cross-cutting issues for consideration. When respondents from civil society organizations and local government were asked to identify cross cutting issues that ought to be considered during the process of designing interventions, 28% underlined illiteracy levels and inadequate community mobilization. Twenty two percent stressed unequal distribution of resources and 19% argued that it was insufficient coordination of efforts undertaken by the different stakeholders. Meanwhile 16% underlined that it is gender inequality; the remaining 15% of the respondents highlighted HIV/AIDS.

**Figure 19: Cross-cutting issues**



*(Source: Primary data)*

In line with the cross cutting issues, when this categories of respondents were asked whether their service delivery objectives are conflict sensitive, 37% affirmed the assertion, while 63% negated it.

The environment in Moroto district is receding at a rapid rate owing to limited alternative livelihoods. Responding to this reality requires economic empowerment of communities and participatory governance which is anchored on mobilized communities able to understand this reality and seek coping mechanisms to address it. An adaptation of a human rights based approach to development which is cognizant of the current global trends like gender equality, conflict sensitivity and consideration for vulnerable groups is of paramount concern.

### **5.17 Conclusion of the presentation of findings**

There is a strong link between the level of service delivery and conflict transformation. Any state that is capable of ensuring infrastructural development can ably contain instances of conflict owing to the ease with which it can intervene in attacks on any community. In addition, availability of services also curtails massive and disruptive movements.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **CONCLUSION, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **6.0. Introduction**

This chapter has begun, first, by providing the summary of the findings. Secondly, it presents recommendations that might help in improving service delivery in a bid to contribute towards conflict transformation. Finally it has given suggestions for further study on matters pertaining to the service delivery and conflict transformation in Moroto district.

#### **6.1. Summary of the findings**

The research investigated and categorized indicators of conflict/insecurity into the following: - first, harsh climatic conditions and the resultant drought (limited alternative livelihoods), secondly, traditional practices that are tied to livelihoods capable of being sustained by the climatic conditions which have orchestrated greed for livestock, thirdly, proliferation of small arms and corrupt tendencies at various levels and fourthly, a clash between the modern and traditional mechanisms of administration. These indicators of conflict and insecurity were a demonstration for the need of conflict transformation in Moroto district.

Pursuant to identifying the indicators for conflict transformation in Moroto district, the research investigated the various facets of conflict transformation giving particular attention to its two components: service delivery and peace building. Amidst the growing and complex intricacies of conflict in Moroto district, the following were identified as crucial in conflict transformation: - efficient and effective service delivery, appropriate policy framework, effective support mechanism and sustainability of interventions in addition to peace building and conflict

resolution mechanisms. Among the effective support mechanisms identified were community empowerment, participation in development, cooperation and coordination of all stakeholders.

The study established that there is a strong linkage between security and the level of service delivery. Service providers cannot easily access areas where social infrastructure is poorly developed, which hinder investment and enhances struggle for the scarce available resources.

The research also focused on the conceptualization of conflict transformation in Uganda. It was noted that much as all policy frameworks designed for conflict transformation in Moroto are integrated (handling both development and peace building components), many actors in the district for years are failing to effectively address the development challenges of the region with practical plans to alleviate the suffering of the people. They have put a lot of efforts on peace building and conflict management measures like disarmament, mediation and negotiation meetings together with the provision of 'soft ware' interventions in the name of trainings in conflict resolution and peace building. However, the policy frameworks applied in development planning on the ground are deficient. Policies like the PEAP, UPE and PMA do not translate past conflict management measures into concrete peace dividends.

The research also investigated the extent to which delivery of social services in Moroto district (water and road and communication network) has effectively improved. The findings show that the state of water has remained relatively poor with people relying heavily on ponds/rivers/unprotected wells and moving to neighbouring districts or over long distances for water and pasture amidst the hyped construction of valley dams all over the region. A great majority of communities together with other stakeholders continue to rely on poorly maintained

Murram or feeder roads that cannot stand the floods or heavy rains and thus impede quick response to emergencies and access to other services.

The research attempted to ascertain whether there is degradation or improvement in the water and road and communication network in Moroto district. It was found out that although there are a lot of structures being put up, there is general degradation of services owing to: a mismatch between the national policy structures and the local community structures. This according to the study has led to the escalation of conflicts, inaccessibility of government service delivery information; low rate of redress of poverty, persistent illiteracy and high levels of prevalence of preventable diseases.

## **6.2 Conclusions**

Current interventions that seek to improve conditions in Moroto appear unlikely to be successful in stemming conflict or insecurity. For example, the social services system is stressed to the point at which interventions of disarmament, improved educational facilities and flow of information will likely have little impact. In fact, some of the respondents have been participating in disarmament and other programmes aimed at contributing towards conflict transformation. While these programmes do encourage stakeholders to actively engage in conflict transformation, they cannot counter adequately the overwhelming demand for interventions to mitigate conflicts.

Addressing the issue of conflict transformation in Karamoja and Moroto in particular will require dealing with the underlying causes of insecurity and conflict in a more collaborative manner.

This will require the Government of Uganda and other stakeholders to recognize the causal

factors in this process, which have been outlined in this dissertation. Unless factors like limited alternative livelihoods; proliferation of small arms and a clash between the modern and traditional mechanisms of administration are recognized and addressed, a reversal of the current conflict will never become a reality.

The study has established that apart from the policies governing interventions in Moroto district, insecurity is not entirely to be blamed on the State; some causes are external and have regional and international dimensions. Their solutions can mainly be achieved through regional and international co-operation. Arms proliferation for example, spill over of conflict from one state to another and the trans border influence of events in other countries on Moroto district can be solved through a multi-thronged approach that needs co-operation of states, international agencies and other stakeholders. The State is responsible for addressing the problem of Karamoja region especially underdevelopment, insecurity, poverty and impunity. The government is supposed to provide protection for people and their property. The State also should have domestic pastoralist policy and legislation for the management of pastoralist areas.

The livelihood systems of many people in Moroto have been significantly undermined by insecurity and conflict. The combined effects have perpetuated insecurity. Responses to insecurity have caused loss of livestock and property, seriously eroding people's ability to cope with repeated and prolonged shocks such as multi-year droughts, repeated crop failures and the pending loss of fertile land to 'investors' and other neighbouring districts which are making a claim on it.

The policy framework that governs conflict transformation interventions in Moroto is lacking the domestic touch. The pastoralist communities, the main inhabitants of Moroto district, rely heavily on policies that apply to predominantly agricultural regions, for instance decentralization or the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture policies of Programme are not informed by livelihood practices of the Karamoja. To say the least, the current Poverty recovery and peace programme (PRDP) has little to offer on Conflict transformation in Karamoja and Moroto in particular.

### **6.3 Recommendations**

To the government of Uganda who bears the primary responsibility for peace, security and development, the study recommends:-

The local people are empowered economically through alternative livelihoods like income generating activities reflected or manifested in people-centered/generated programmes like NUREP and NAADS.

Deliberate efforts are made to develop policy framework suitable for pastoralists which recognizes pastoral transhumance as the appropriate livelihood strategy for an environment which is drought-prone rather than sedentarization.

Provision of a legal framework for addressing pastoralist problems especially matters concerning security, in line with legal provisions enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda and based on Universal Human Rights rather than programmes which are most often trial and error in nature and incapable of taking into consideration lessons learnt from previous initiatives. In addition, such legal frameworks ought to cover the national (State) security needs and those of

the pastoralists through strengthening and promoting a genuine fusing of the modern and traditional models of conflict transformation in pastoral areas, especially Moroto district.

Facilitate coordination between central / local government officials and other development partners and ensure the development of capacity of local community institutions so as to enable community-based or other relevant organizations to be consulted before economic programmes are planned /implemented in pastoral zones like Moroto.

Address the causal factors of conflict in the Karamoja region, such as the harsh climatic conditions and the resultant drought, through re-thinking of the current disarmament strategy so that it follows, and not precedes, development in Moroto district.

International agencies, the local and national NGOs and other stakeholders working in Moroto district, who are partners of development, should:-

Strengthen and work through the local government structures in order to ensure sustainability of their interventions rather than present sole implemented projects that tend to be supported by unplanned efforts.

Appreciate, recognize and advocate for the unique conditions under which the pastoralist communities live and genuinely involve the final beneficiaries throughout the project cycle so as to ensure ownership of interventions.

Pursue a multi-sectoral approach to peace and development with critical emphasis on provision and improvement of social service delivery as a channel of sustainable conflict transformation of Moroto district.



#### **6.4. Suggestions for further study**

The study on the Social service delivery and conflict transformation in Moroto district has not been exhaustive but has managed to explore the place of the state in conflict transformation especially in providing social services to Moroto district. Due to globalization and the wide influence of multinational corporations and transnational agencies, the role of the state seems to have diminished in the international system. Perhaps future research on conflict transformation studies should focus on the effects of these globalization forces on pastoralists' security.

Many issues were raised in this study especially the concern with the current land wrangles which are spreading towards Moroto district. It is necessary to do research on the relevance of the present national land issues in conflict transformation. Since the changing circumstances have also shaped the meaning of security it is also necessary to do more research on the pastoralist understanding of security taking into consideration the new holistic conceptualization of human security.

The study was carried out in a predominantly pastoralist setting and given an inadequate understanding of models of service delivery, an investigation into special models for service delivery (water and roads) - based on a clear understanding of migratory patterns - needs to be documented and improved in the light of the changing times.

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## Appendix I: - Key informants Questionnaire

Approaches to conflict transformation often take the form of Mediation and negotiation talks with hardly any emphasis on the key role efficient and effective service delivery plays in the process.

This questionnaire aims at collecting input from the local communities, in a bid to contribute towards efficient, effective and sustainable service delivery models capable of contributing towards conflict transformation in Moroto District.

You are therefore kindly invited to provide the information required as much as possible in a comprehensive way and be guaranteed of the confidentiality of the data you give.

### Personal Data

Name of the Respondent.....

County ----- Sub County -----

Parish ----- Village/ LC1 -----

Place of residence

Town { } Trading center { } Rural { }

1. How long have you been living in Moroto?

Below 5 years { } 5 -10 years { } 10 and above { }

2. Do you have any idea about the policy framework that governs service delivery and conflict transformation in Moroto district? Yes { } No { }

3. If yes, what does the government do in Sensitize the Karimojong about that policy framework?

4. Do you have any idea about the policy framework that governs Conflict transformation in Moroto district?

5. If yes, what does the government do in sensitizing the Karimojong about that policy framework?

6. If yes, what does the government do in Sensitize the Karimojong about that policy framework?
7. Do NGOs and other humanitarian organizations operating in Moroto District Educate the Karimojong about the above policies?
8. If yes, what have they done in this area
9. What is the main source of water for daily use in the household?
 

• Piped in dwelling { }	• Unprotected well/spring { }
• Piped outside dwelling { }	• Rain water { }
• Public tap { }	• Vendor/tanker truck { }
• Protected well/spring { }	• River/pond/stream { }
10. How far is your source of water?
11. For how many months in the year is water available in that source? When the water source dries up where do you go for water, in the dry season?
12. What type of road connects your community to the closest trading center/social center?
 

Tarmac Road { } Murram road { } Feeder Roads { } Foot paths { }
13. Is the road well maintained? And who maintains it? Is the community involved in issues surrounding the road network?
14. Have you developed a new road in the last 10 years? Who initiated the idea of the new road, who made the new road and how long did it take to be implemented?
15. What does the government do in providing your community with social services (roads/water)?
16. Do the communities participate in the planning of the services?
17. Do you contribute to the process of service delivery in your community [planning meetings, service allocation] If no, how would you expect to be involved?

18. Historically or in the history of Moroto district, has there been any planning for service delivery?
19. If yes how was it done?
20. Do you observe any improvement or degradation in service delivery in Moroto?
21. If there is improvement, Please explain how?
22. If there is degradation please explain why?
23. Is the issue of insecurity in Moroto? (a) Very important, not very important, very critical, no problem at all
24. What are the main types of insecurity available in Moroto district?
25. What do you think are the main courses of insecurity in Moroto district?
26. How does the insecurity in your community affect your daily life?
27. How does it affect you economically,
28. How does insecurity affect you socially or politically?
29. Do you think there is a link between poor services such as water and road and communication network and the problem insecurity? If yes explain the linkage?
30. Have you observed any efforts towards conflict transformation and resolution in Moroto district?
31. If yes what institutions deal with conflict transformation in your community?
32. Does Ugandan government provide security to your community? If yes how?
33. If no which other agents provide security to your community?
34. Are the Karimojong, of Moroto District, seen as a national threat to the Ugandan security agents?
35. Do you perceive yourself as a national threat to the

36. What security arrangement has been proposed by government to contribute to peace in Moroto
37. Do you think that this arrangement suitable to the Karimojong, explain your answer to the above?
38. Can you suggest the better alternative for the security?
39. Have you been involved in the disarmament exercise?
40. Do you think it was well timed?
41. Explain your answer
42. In your view which aspect contributes most to peace and development in your community, (a) disarmament exercise (b) delivery of social services (c) others, specify...
43. Apart from the military solution proposed for Moroto district, do you think that there are other alternatives for conflict transformation in your community? If yes, specify.....
44. Do you have any partnership (collaborative arrangements) with other groups or organizations for the delivery of services in your community? If so, with whom?
45. Briefly describe the strategies or models of conflict transformation that you have utilized?
46. Are those partnerships linked to conflict transformation in your community?
47. Are there factors within your community that contribute to insecurity? If so, what are they?
48. How do they contribute to insecurity
49. Do you use traditional methods of conflict transformation in Moroto District? If yes, which ones
50. Imagine that you are made president of Uganda what would you do differently to resolve the problem of insecurity in Moroto District?
51. Do the policies and actions of regional and international actors affect the peace situation in Moroto district UNDP, IGAD?



52. Do the policies and actions of regional and international actors (IGAD, UN, UNICEF, and World Food Programme) affect the service delivery in Moroto district?
53. Have you noticed any disagreement between policies for regional security and the Uganda government arrangement to protect Moroto citizens?

## **Appendix II: - Questionnaire for Government Officials/NGOs**

1. According to government what are the main security concerns in Moroto district? (give two)
2. According to international organizations working in Moroto District what are the main security concerns of this area (give Two)
3. According to the local NGOs working in Moroto district what are the main security concerns (give two)
4. From the government position what are the main sources of insecurity in Moroto district
5. From the international organizations working in Moroto district what are the main sources of insecurity in Moroto district (give two)
6. From the local NGOs position what are the main sources of insecurity in Moroto district
7. How does Uganda government provide security to people in Moroto district?
8. According to you as a government officer is this adequate?
9. According to you as international organization is this adequate?
10. According to you as local NGO is this adequate?
11. How does security situation in Moroto affect your work?
12. Is the provision of security a national priority for the government in Uganda? Please explain your answer
13. Is there a contradiction between the government security arrangement and the concerns of the local communities in Moroto District? Please explain your answer
14. What is the state of road network in Moroto District?
15. What is the state of water service delivery in Moroto District?
16. Do you think water service delivery in Moroto District is adequate? Explain your answer
17. Do you think the road delivery in Moroto district is adequate? Explain your answer

18. What measures has government taken in addressing service delivery matters in Moroto district
19. To what extent have international Organizations participated in providing services like water and road?
20. To what extent have local NGOs participated in providing services like water and road
21. How does the state of water and road service delivery affect your work in Moroto District?
22. To what extent has historical planning for service delivery been done in Moroto district? If so what has happened to cause degradation of service delivery?
23. Have you participated in Planning for service delivery? If so what role did you play?
24. It has been reported in the press that there is degradation in service delivery in Moroto, can you give two major causes of this degradation?
25. To what extent has historical planning for service delivery been done in Moroto district? If so what has happened to cause degradation of service delivery?
26. Do you have any partnership (collaborative arrangements) in the provision of service delivery in Moroto District? If so, with whom?
27. Since the break out of conflict in Moroto District, what has been done to review service delivery?
28. Do you know of a national policy that is being implemented for service delivery in Moroto District
29. If yes, when was it formulated?
30. How does it promote peace and security for the local communities
31. How does it help you in your work?
32. Do you think as an organization that there is a link between poor services such as water and road and communication network and the problem insecurity? If yes explain the linkage?

33. Have you been eliciting community participation in service delivery?
34. If so, what are the advantages of such a method of work (give two)
35. What institutions deal with conflict transformation in Moroto district?
36. In your development programme, do you link your objectives to conflict transformation in Moroto district?
37. Have you participated in joint activities that promote integrated service delivery? If so, with which other organization or group?
38. If so, what strategies/models have you been using? (get documents)
39. What challenges have you encountered in linking development to service delivery? (give two), please explain your answer
40. Given an opportunity to change your programme strategies, what would you do differently?
41. What other cross cutting issues affect provision of social services in Moroto District


### **Appendix III: - Focus group discussion guide**

1. What are the two main issues facing people in your community?
2. Do you know of any organizations working to alleviate the problems for people living in your community? If so, what can you tell me about them?
3. Do you know of a national policy that is being implemented for service delivery in your community?
4. It has been reported in the press that there is degradation in service delivery in Moroto; can you give two major causes of this degradation?
5. Do you think as a group that there is a link between poor services such as water and road and communication network and the problem insecurity? If yes explain the linkage?
6. Do you contribute to the process of service delivery in your community [planning meetings, service allocation] If no, how would you expect to be involved?
7. According to you what are the main security concerns in Moroto district? (give two)
8. Are there factors within your community that contribute to insecurity? If so, what are they?
9. How do they contribute to insecurity?
10. How does security situation in your community affect your work?
11. How does Uganda government provide security to people in Moroto district?
12. Is there a contradiction between the government security arrangement and the concerns of your community? Please explain your answer
13. Apart from the military solution proposed for Moroto district, do you think that there are other alternatives for conflict transformation in your community? If yes, specify.....
14. Do you use traditional methods of conflict transformation in Moroto District? If yes, which ones
15. What do you see as long term solutions to community's problems?

#### **Appendix IV: - Observation Checklist**

1. The nature of social services (roads and water) in Moroto district – out of the 50 boreholes, (geographical coverage, status, community ownership – train in management, sensitization on good practices – have you had any training on rationing of water)
2. The relations between government structures and local community structures
3. The lifestyle of the community
4. The work of the local NGOs
5. The work of international Organizations
6. Linkages between development strategies and service delivery/security e.g. educational programmes, HIV/AIDS and environment

**APPENDIX V:**  
**MAP OF KARAMOJA REGION SHOWING MOROTO DISTRICT - STUDY AREA**



**Appendix VI: - MOROTO DISTRICT DATA SET FOR WORKS AND TECHNICAL SERVICES**

Category	Road code	Road name	Road length (km)	County	Sub county
Central Works	24011	Moroto - Nadunget	10		
	24041	Moroto - Lokitanyal	44		
	24031	Nadunget - Lokapel	46		
	24032	Lokapel - Chosan	29.8		
	24051	Chosan - Amudat	34		
	24033	Chosan - Angatun	27		
	24034	Angatun - Nabilatuk	24.4		
	24062	Nabilatuk - Lokapel	21		
	24071	Ariamaoi - Lopeei	30		
	24021	Nadunget - Akisim	74		
		Angatun - Namalu	6		
<b>Total</b>			<b>346.3</b>		
<b>DISTRICT Roads</b>	3201	Lia - Tepeth	2.4	Matheniko	Katikekile
	3202	Nakonyen - Katikekile	10.2	„	„
	3203	Tapach - Katikekile	10	„	„
	3208	Nadiket - Komaret	5.8	„	„
	3207	Loputuk - Nadun	12.4	„	Nadunget
	3206	Moroto Town — Acholi inn	0.9	„	Rupa
	3204	Acholi inn - Rupa	8.6	„	„
	3205	Rupa - Nakiloro	6.4	„	„
	3240	Nakiloro - Nakabaat	19.4	„	„
	3243	Naoi - Lokisilei	28.1	„	„
Subtotal			106.2		



	3213	Lorengecora - Tirikol	22	Bokora	Iriir
	3219	Lokopo—Turtuko-Apeitolim	65.2	„	Lokopo
	3220	Kokeris - Lopei	18.4	„	Matany/ Lopei
	3221	Kangole - Matany	8	„	Matany
	3222	Matany-Lokopo	15.3	„	„
	3225	Kangole - Lotome	12.2	„	Ngoleriet/ Lotome
	3226	Kalotom — Kangole Ju	0.9	„	Ngoleriet
	3227	Kalotom - Atapar	7	„	„
	3242	Lopei - Turtuko	19.3	„	Loped
	3244	fun - Apeitolim	50	„	Iriir/Lokopo
	3245	fun - Napak	29.9	„	Iriir
Subtotal			248.2		
<b>Grand Total</b>			<b>354.4</b>		
<b>SUBCOUNTY/ COMMUNITY ROADS</b>					
	0001	Tapach - Loyaraboth	8	Matheniko	Katikekile
	0002	Loyaraboth- Lopelipel	10	„	„
	0003	Lopelipel - Kakingol	40	„	„
	0004	Lopelipel - Lomelan	4	„	„
	0005	Lopelipel - Narengiya	4	„	„
	0006	Nakiloro - Kakingol	6	„	„
	0007	Tapac - Arongoleret	7	„	„
	0008	Rupa - Nakadanya	20	„	Rupa
	0009	Nakiloro - Loyoro	60	„	„
	0010	Rupa-Kaloi	8	„	„
	0011	Komo - Lomaratoit	6	Bokora	Iriir
	0012	Kaurikiakine- Kwokipurat	4	„	„

	0013	Main road- Cholichol	3	„	„
	0014	Iriir - Pilas	6	„	„
	0015	Matany - Lokopo	8	„	Lokopo
	0016	Lomuno - Kalokengel	5	„	Lotome
	0017	Lomuno-Kokeris	8	„	„
	0018	Kangole - Kautakou	6	„	Ngoleriet
	0019	Kaloi - Nadunget	6	Matheniko	Nadunget
	0020	Lotirir - Nakonyen	10	„	„
<b>Total Length</b>			<b>229</b>		

**Appendix VII: - MOROTO WATER SUPPLY-SUMMARY REPORT BY SUB COUNTY  
UP TO JUNE 2007**

No.	Sub county	Population 2002	Pop project 2007	Deep B/H	Type of sources				Operational status			Abond	Service coverage	Pop served 07	Exp. Un served pop 07
					S.well	Pro. spr	GFS/ Taps	Total	B/H	Taps	B/H				
1	Irimi	23910	42,800	49	-	0	13	62	37	2	18	7	40.0	17,100	25,700
2	Lokopo	15719	24,300	36	-	0	0	36	20		12	4	39.5	9,600	14,700
3	Lopeei	14410	27,500	30	-	0	0	30	17		11	2	30.5	8,400	19,100
4	Lotome	23126	41,600	34	-	0	0	34	14		15	5	20.9	8,700	32,900
5	Matany	20422	27,300	62	-	0	12	74	38	12	17	7	69.2	18,900	8,400
6	Ngoleriet	15112	19,800	45	-	0	2	47	28		12	5	60.6	12,000	7,800
	<b>Bokora</b>	<b>112697</b>	<b>176800</b>	<b>256</b>	-	<b>0</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>283</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>42.3</b>	<b>74,700</b>	<b>102,100</b>
1	Katikekile	20595	26500	28	-	3	0	31	16	2	8	3	28.7	7,600	18,900
2	Nadunget	25395	26200	56	-	0	2	58	34	2	17	5	60.7	15,900	10,300
3	Rupa	23873	29900	33	-	0	2	35	17	2	12	4	31.1	9,300	20,600
	<b>Matheniko</b>	<b>69863</b>	<b>81100</b>	<b>117</b>	-	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>32,400</b>	<b>48,700</b>
1	North Division	3767	3100	28	-	-	18	46	35	18	7	4	552.6	16,200	-13,100
2	South Division	3613	3400	15	-	-	15	30	23	15	5	2	335.3	11,400	-8,000
	<b>Moroto Municipal</b>	<b>7380</b>	<b>6500</b>	<b>43</b>	-	-	<b>33</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>424.6</b>	<b>27,600</b>	<b>-21,100</b>
	<b>District</b>	<b>189940</b>	<b>250700</b>	<b>416</b>	-	<b>3</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>483</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>53.7</b>	<b>134,700</b>	<b>116,000</b>

District Service Coverage = 53.7%

Deep B/Hole Functionality Rate = 67.1%